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CONTEMPT OF THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT-A NEW LOOK
Laura B. Bartell*
With the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Con-
gress worked a sweeping revision of the nation's bankruptcy laws.
As part of this massive reform measure, Congress reinvented the
role of the bankruptcy judge, granting the judge a host of new pow-
ers. Because these new powers were so substantial and because
Congress elected to establish bankruptcy judges as Article I rather
than Article III judges, the Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., declared those por-
tions of the Act delineating the powers and structure of the bank-
ruptcy courts unconstitutional. Congress responded by passing the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 to
address the Court's constitutional concerns.
Despite the Court's decision in Marathon and Congress's re-
sponse, the extent of a bankruptcy judge's power remains unclear,
particularly as to whether a bankruptcy judge has the statutory or
inherent power of contempt. In this article, Laura Bartell provides
a thorough analysis of this issue and reaches the compelling con-
clusion that bankruptcy judges lack the contempt power and that to
invest the non-Article III bankruptcy courts with such power
would violate the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has called the power to punish for contempt
of court "essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the
courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice."' The
Court considers the contempt power so critical to the judicial function
that it has characterized the authority as "inherent" or "implied" by
the very nature of a court's existence.'
* Member, Shearman & Sterling, New York, N.Y. B.A. 1975, Stanford; J.D. 1978,
Harvard.
1. Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); see also Gompers v. Bucks Store
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Young v. United States ex
rel Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795-96 & n.8 (1987); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 370 (1966); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960); Michaelson v. United States ex
rel Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194
U.S. 324, 326 (1904); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302-03 (1888); Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Although the proposition has become a
maxim through repetition, the early cases on which it rests are of questionable authority. In
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 3 and the resulting reconstitu-
tion of the bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,1 courts and commentators have grap-
pled with the issue of whether the reconfigured bankruptcy courts
have the statutory or inherent power of contempt and, if so, whether
the exercise of such power would infringe impermissibly on the pro-
tections afforded by Article III of the Constitution.5 Although one
circuit court of appeals and several lower courts have held to the con-
trary,6 most courts have concluded that, at least with respect to civil
Hudson & Goodwin, the Court actually held that United States circuit courts lack common-law
criminal jurisdiction, but in so holding, it stated:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice, from the nature of
their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers. To
fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, enforce the observance of order, &c., are powers
which cannot be dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others: and so far our courts, no doubt, possess powers not immediately derived from stat-
ute; but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common-law cases, we are of opinion, is not
within their implied powers.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34. Anderson v. Dunn dealt not with the inherent contempt power of the
courts, but that of the House of Representatives. In refusing to permit the plaintiff, who had
been found guilty of contempt of the House, to sue the House Sergeant at Arms for assault and
battery and false imprisonment, the Court first commented on the judicial contempt power:
On this principle it is, that courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by
their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect and decorum, in their presence,
and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
It is true, that the courts of justice of the United States are vested, by express statute
provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does not follow, from this
circumstance, that they would not have exercised that power, without the aid of the statute,
or not in cases, if such should occur, to which such statute provision may not extend; on the
contrary, it is a legislative assertion of this right, as incidental to a grant of judicial power,
and can only be considered, only as an instance of abundant caution, or a legislative declara-
tion, that the power of punishing for contempt shall not extend beyond its known and ac-
knowledged limits of fine and imprisonment.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 227-28. Perhaps the most frequently cited case, Exparte Robinson, began
with a sweeping statement:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments,
orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with juris-
diction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510. However, the Court then interpreted the Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4
Stat. 487, which it stated had "limited and defined" the contempt power, and found that no
contemptuous conduct within the meaning of the statute had occurred. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 512.
3. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). For a listing of the specific provisions amended
by BAFJA, see 28 U.S.C. § 151 note (1988) (short title).
5. Section 1 of Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
6. See, eg., Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.
1987); Tele-wire Supply Corp. v. Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.), 55
B.R. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In re Continental Air Lines,
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contempt, bankruptcy courts have the statutory and/or inherent power
to issue final orders within their core jurisdiction and that the statu-
tory scheme for appeal of those orders satisfies all requirements of the
Constitution.7
This article suggests that those cases fail to apply the correct prin-
ciples in analyzing the statutory and constitutional issues involved,
thereby threatening the very constitutional foundation of the bank-
ruptcy system by chipping away at one of its cornerstones. The con-
clusions forced by precedent-rather than expediency-must be that
a bankruptcy court has no independent contempt power and that any
delegation of the district court's contempt authority to the bankruptcy
court would violate Article III of the Constitution.
I. THE CONTEMPT POWER BEFORE MARATHON
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the 1898 Act)8 originally consti-
tuted bankruptcy courts not as separate juridical bodies but as preex-
isting United States district and territorial courts made "courts of
bankruptcy" by the conferral of original jurisdiction in bankruptcy
proceedings.9 The ability of these "bankruptcy courts" to exercise
contempt power was recognized early' 0 and consistently" after their
legislative creation.' 2 The source of such power was the inherent
power of United States courts to enforce their orders,13 the power of
contempt conferred on United States courts by section 725 of the Re-
Inc.), 61 B.R. 758 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Omega Equip. Corp. v. John C. Louis Co., Inc. (In re
Omega Equip. Corp.), 51 B.R. 569 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985); Lindsey v. Cryts (In re Cox Cotton
Co.), 24 B.R. 930 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lindsey v. Ipock,
732 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton, 25 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Eck v.
Dodge Chem. Co. (In re Power Recovery Sys., Inc.), 950 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1991); Mountain Am.
Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990); Burd v. Walters (In re
Walters), 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989); Commercial Banking Co. v. Jones (In re Maxair Aircraft
Corp. of Ga., Inc.), 148 B.R. 353 (M.D. Ga. 1992); Kimco Leasing, Inc. v. Knee, 144 B.R. 1001
(N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Schatz, 122 B.R. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see also cases cited infra notes 103-
04.
8. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 1-70, 30 Stat. 544, 544-66 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
9. See id. § la(8), 30 Stat. at 544 (defining "courts of bankruptcy"); id. § 2, 30 Stat. at 545
(creating courts of bankruptcy and their jurisdiction).
10. See Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 F. 131, 135 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 1902).
11. See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 67 (1948); Femos-Lopez v. United States District
Court, 599 F.2d 1087, 1090 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Pagano v. Sahn (In re
Murray Packing Co.), 414 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1969); Goggin v. Bolso Chica Oil Corp. (In re
Sterling), 125 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1942); Ben Hyman & Co. v. Fulton Nat'l Bank (In re Ben
Hyman & Co.), 423 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1976), appeal dismissed, 577 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1978); Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280, 284-85 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); In re Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Souderton, 287 F. Supp. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
12. The Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1979), substantially amended
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but the amendments did not affect the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts.
13. See cases cited supra note 2.
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vised Statutes of the United States, 4 and the power of the courts of
bankruptcy under sections 2(13), (15) and (16) of the 1898 Act.'5
The courts of bankruptcy had the power to appoint referees for
terms of two years,' 6 to exercise certain limited jurisdiction,' 7 and to
perform specified duties.' Referees were not "courts of bankruptcy"
or "judges" within the statutory language, and they had no independ-
ent power to cite parties for contempt. Instead, the Act required
referees to "certify the facts to the judge, if any person shall [engage
in contemptuous behavior]" and directed the judge to hear evidence
and punish the conduct "in the same manner and to the same extent
as for a contempt committed before the court of bankruptcy."' 9
14. Section 725 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, based on § 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83, was the predecessor to the current criminal contempt statute, 18
U.S.C. § 401 (1994). Section 725 provided that all courts of the United States "shall have power
to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court, contempts of their authority."
15. Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (later redesignated as section 2a) vested the
courts of bankruptcy with jurisdiction to, among-other things:
(13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all lawful orders,
by fine or imprisonment;
(15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to
those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act;
(16) punish persons for contempts committed before referees ....
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
16. Id. § 34, 30 Stat. at 555 (appointment of referees).
17. Id. § 38, 30 Stat. at 555 (jurisdiction of referees).
18. Id. § 39, 30 Stat. at 555-56 (duties of referees).
19. Id § 41b, 30 Stat. at 556. Section 41 read in full:
a. A person shall not, in proceedings before a referee, (1) disobey or resist any lawful order,
process, or writ; (2) misbehave during a hearing or so near the place thereof as to obstruct
the same; (3) neglect to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any pertinent docu-
ment; or (4) refuse to appear after having been subpoenaed, or, upon appearing, refuse to
take the oath as a witness, or [after] having taken the oath, refuse to be examined according
to law: Provided, That [no] a person other than a bankrpt or, where the bankrupt is a
corporation, its officers, or tie members of its board ot directors or trustees or ot other
similar controlling bodies, shall not be required to attend as a witness betore a reteree at a
place [outside of the State of hi'i"Fesidence, and] more than one hundred miles from such
person's place of residence[, and only in case] or unless his lawful mileage and fee for one
a sattendance shall be first paid or tendered to hm.
b. The referee shall forthwith certify the facts to the judge, if any person shall do any of the
things forbidden in this section, and he may serve or cause to be served upon such person an
order requiring such person to appear betore the judge upon a day certain to show cause
why he should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the tacts so certified. the judge
shall thereupon, in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to the acts complained of[,]
and, if it is such as to warrant him in so doing, punish such person in the same manner and
to the same extent as for a contempt committed before [the court of bankruptcy] him, or
commit such person upon the same conditions as if the doing of the forbidden act-had
occurred with reference to the process of[,] the court of bankruptcy or in the presence off,]
the [court] judge.
Id. § 41, 30 Stat. at 556 (bracketed material was deleted and underscored language added by the
Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 41, 52 Stat. 840, 859-60).
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In 1973, the United States Supreme Court adopted2° the Bank-
ruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms.21 Over the dissent of
Justice Douglas,22 Rule 920 provided bankruptcy referees with new
contempt power, allowing them to cite and punish for civil and crimi-
nal contempt by imposing fines of up to $250.23
With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Code),24 the bankruptcy court became a "court of the United
20. 411 U.S. 991 (1973).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-623, 78 Stat. 1001
(1964)) gave the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process,
writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure" under the Bankruptcy Act. The
statute further provided that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect" after the rules became effective; the rules were not, however, to "abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right." Id. The statute was amended in 1978 to substitute the words "in
cases under title 11" for "under the Bankruptcy Act" and to delete the language providing for
bankruptcy rules to overrule inconsistent legislation. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 1930(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2672.
22. Justice Douglas stated that "it is for me alarming to vest appointees of [the] bankruptcy
courts with the power to punish for contempt .... Extension of the contempt power to adminis-
trative arms of the bankruptcy court is not consistent with close confinement of the contempt
power." 411 U.S. at 993-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. Former Rule 920 of the Bankruptcy Rules read as follows:
Rule 920. Contempt Proceedings.
(a) Contempt committed in proceedings before referee.
(1) Summary disposition by referee-Misbehavior prohibited by § 41a (2) of the Act
may be punished summarily by the referee as contempt if he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and it was committed in his actual presence. The order of con-
tempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the referee and entered of record.
(2) Disposition by referee upon notice and hearing-Any other conduct prohibited by
§ 41a of the Act may be punished by the referee only after hearing on notice. The notice
shall be in writing and shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time
for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the con-
tempt charged and whether the contempt is criminal or civil or both. The notice may be
given on the referee's own initiative or on motion by a party, by the United States attorney,
or by an attorney appointed by the referee for that purpose. If the contempt charged in-
volves disrespect to or criticism of the referee, he is disqualified from presiding at the hear-
ing except with the consent of the person charged.
(3) Limits on punishment by referee-A referee shall not order imprisonment nor im-
pose a fine of more than $250 as punishment for any contempt, civil or criminal.
(4) Certification to district judge-If it appears to a referee that conduct prohibited by
§ 41a of the Act may warrant punishment by imprisonment or by a fine of more than $250,
he may certify the facts to the district judge. On such certification the judge shall proceed as
for a contempt not committed in his presence.
(b) Contempt committed in proceedings before district judge-Any contempt committed in
proceedings before a district judge while acting as a bankruptcy judge shall be prosecuted as
any other contempt of the district court.
(c) Right to jury trial-Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right to jury
trial whenever it otherwise exists.
411 U.S. at 1100-01; see, e.g., Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977) (holding, among other things, that district
courts should review bankruptcy court findings of fact of contempt under the clearly erroneous
standard upon certification pursuant to Rule 920(a)(4)).
For a critique of the approach adopted in Rule 920, see Jonathan M. Landers, The New
Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827, 865-67
(1973).
24. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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States"25 with jurisdiction over "all cases under title 11" and "all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.1126 Congress conferred on the bankruptcy courts all
"powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty," with the qualifica-
tion that they could not enjoin another court or punish an act of crimi-
nal contempt not committed in their presence or punishable by
imprisonment.27 Congress perpetuated the residual grant of authority
previously contained in section 2(15) of the 1898 Act in section 105(a)
of the Code which permits bankruptcy courts to issue "any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions of this title. '28
The original structure of the new bankruptcy courts rendered
self-evident the conclusion that they could exercise civil and criminal
contempt power. First, Congress created them as independent
courts-"adjuncts" to the district courts;29 therefore, they had the in-
herent power vested in any "court" to enforce its orders. Second, they
were not only "courts" but also "courts of the United States"; thus,
they had statutory contempt power.30  Third, Congress explicitly
granted them the "powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty. '31
These powers must have included the contempt power, or the limita-
tion on that power, excluding criminal contempts not committed in
the court's presence or punishable by imprisonment, would be mean-
25. Id. § 213, 92 Stat. at 2661 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988)) (adding "bank-
ruptcy courts" to the list of courts defined as a "court of the United States").
26. Id. § 241(a), 92 Stat. at 2668 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1471). Subsections (a) through (c)
of section 1471 read as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court
or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.
Id. (omitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1471).
27. Id. § 241(a), 92 Stat. at 2671 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1481). Section 1481 provided that
"[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admirality, but may not
enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge
of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment."
28. Id. § 105(a), 92 Stat. at 2555 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994)).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 151 ("There shall be in each judicial district, as an adjunct to the district
court for such district, a bankruptcy court which shall be a court of record known as the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the district.").
30. The pertinent section provides that:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1481.
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ingless. Finally, the new bankruptcy courts could rely on the residual
authority granted by section 105(a) of the Code which some courts
concluded authorized contempt orders as a "necessary or appropri-
ate" means to carry out their functions.3 2
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MARATHON
The Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.33 found that the broad jurisdictional grant to
bankruptcy courts set forth in § 1471 of Title 28 of the United States
Code violated Article III of the United States Constitution.34 A four-
judge plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, rea-
soned that neither of the two grounds urged by the appellants could
justify the adjudicative powers conferred by Congress on the non-Ar-
ticle III bankruptcy courts.
The Court first found that Congress did not constitute the bank-
ruptcy courts as Article I "legislative" courts, nor could the precedents
for the creation of such courts (territorial courts, the courts of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, courts of court-martial, and administrative agencies
adjudicating cases involving "public rights") support the broad grant
of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. The Court declined to
adopt a new rationale for the creation of non-Article III bankruptcy
courts based on the power of Congress to establish "uniform Laws on
32. See, e.g., In re Reed, 11 B.R. 258, 261-62 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (relying on inherent
power of bankruptcy courts, as well as 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1481, to conclude that
bankruptcy courts could issue civil contempt citations); see also In re Ashby, 36 B.R. 976, 978
(Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (relying on In re Reed); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that bankruptcy courts are
empowered to punish for civil contempt); Kings Plaza Shopping Ctr. of Flatbush Ave., Inc. v.
Jolly Joint, Inc. (In re Jolly Joint, Inc.), 23 B.R. 395, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (relying on
§ 105(a) for authority to issue civil contempt citations); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1981) (concluding that bankruptcy courts can sanction violations of stay orders); In re
Norton, 15 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 32 B.R. 698 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983) (relying on
§ 105(a) to uphold the bankruptcy court's exercise of contempt); cf. In re Hackney, 20 B.R. 158
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) (finding the IRS in contempt); Mealey v. Department of Treasury (In re
Mealey), 16 B.R. 800 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (awarding fines under Rule 920).
33. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
34. Id. at 87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91-92 (concurring opinion).
35. Id. at 63. The plurality noted that congressional control over territories and the District
of Columbia rested on the absence of a state government in these geographical areas. Article
IV, thus, empowers Congress to exercise the "complete power of government" in these loca-
tions. Id at 64-65. Congress has the authority to provide for courts of court-martial under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution which gives Congress the power to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Id. at 66. Although
the plurality noted that "[t]he distinction between public rights and private rights has not been
definitively explained in our precedents," id. at 69, it concluded that the right to recover contract
damages, which was at issue in Marathon, involved "the adjudication of state-created private
rights," rather than "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations." Id. at 71. Thus, bankruptcy
court jurisdiction over such a right could not be justified by cases involving adjudication of public
rights by legislative courts or administrative agencies.
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the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,"36 noting
that such a rationale would permit Congress, acting pursuant to its
Article I powers, to "create courts free of Art. III's requirements
whenever it finds that course expedient. '37
Second, the Court concluded that the bankruptcy courts, as con-
figured under § 1471 of Title 28 of the United States Code, were not
mere "adjuncts" of the district court whose authority could be analo-
gized to that of administrative agencies and magistrates acting in that
capacity. While recognizing that "Congress possesses broad discretion
to assign factfinding functions to an adjunct created to aid in the adju-
dication of congressionally created statutory rights," the Court ruled
that Congress does not have the same degree of discretion with re-
spect to rights not created by it.38 Comparing the powers of a bank-
ruptcy court, on which Congress purported to confer jurisdiction of
state-created rights, with the owers of the administrative agency chal-
lenged in Crowell v. Benson3Wand the powers of U.S. magistrates con-
sidered in United States v. Raddatz,4° the plurality concluded that the
bankruptcy courts were exercising far greater powers than those con-
stitutional adjuncts; thus, the grant of such powers violated Article
111.41
The causes of action whose delegation to the bankruptcy court
the Court found to violate the constitutional protections of separation
of powers-claims for breach of contract and warranty, misrepresen-
tation, coercion, and duress-were all state law claims which were
"the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts
at Westminster in 1789. "142 In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice O'Connor, agreed with the plurality that the bank-
ruptcy courts were not "adjuncts" of an Article III court.43 However,
he declined to endorse the plurality's analysis of Congress's Article I
powers, especially with respect to the "public rights" doctrine, con-
cluding only that, whatever the scope of that doctrine, it could not
support adjudication of the causes of action at issue in Marathon.4
Although the plurality opinion in Marathon did not directly ad-
dress the authority of a bankruptcy court to exercise contempt power,
Justice Brennan distinguished the bankruptcy courts from the admin-
istrative agency involved in Crowell v. Benson by emphasizing that
"[t]he agency did not possess the power to enforce any of its compen-
sation orders: On the contrary, every compensation order was appeal-
36. Id. at 72 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id. at 81-82.
39. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
40. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
41. 458 U.S. at 86-87.
42. Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
44. Id.
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able to the appropriate federal district court, which had the sole
power to enforce it or set it aside . . . -"' The bankruptcy court, on
the other hand, could "exercise all ordinary powers of district courts,
including the power to preside over jury trials,.., and the power to
issue any order, process, or judgment appropriate for the enforcement
of the provisions of Title 11 . ... ."6 As a result, the Court concluded
that the Code "vests all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power of
the United States in the 'adjunct' bankruptcy court. 47
III. RULE-MAKING AND LEGISLATION AFTER MARATHON
In August 1982, less than two months after the Marathon deci-
sion, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules transmitted to the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States proposed rules and forms for practice under
the Code. The Supreme Court adopted the new Bankruptcy Rules on
April 25, 1983, and transmitted them to Congress, which permitted
them to become effective ninety days thereafter.48 Bankruptcy Rule
9020 modified former Bankruptcy Rule 920 to include the limitations
of § 1481 of Title 28 of the United States Code on the power of the
bankruptcy court to punish criminal contempt not committed in the
presence of the bankruptcy judge or warranting a punishment of im-
prisonment. Rule 9020 provided procedures for punishment of those
criminal contempts within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
under § 1481, while permitting the judge to certify the facts to the
district court in cases beyond the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.49
45. Id. at 78. The plurality repeatedly emphasized the absence of the power of the Com-
pensation Commission (the administrative agency whose jurisdiction was at issue in Crowell) to
enforce its orders. See id. at 85 ("[Tlhe agency in Crowell possessed only a limited power to
issue compensation orders pursuant to specialized procedures, and its orders could be enforced
only by order of the district court .... [T]he agency in Crowell was required by law to seek
enforcement of its compensation orders in the district court."); id. at 86 n.38 ("Although the
entry of an enforcement order is in some respects merely formal, it has long been recognized
that '[t]he award of execution. .. is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a
court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term, without it.'"
(citations omitted)).
46. Id at 85.
47. Id. at 84-85 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
48. See 9 COLLMR ON BANKRUPTCY 9020 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Supp.
1995).
49. Bankruptcy Rule 9020, as adopted in 1983, read as follows:
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEDURES
(a) Procedure(1) Summary Disposition. Criminal contempt which may be punished by a bankruptcyjudge acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1481 may be punished summarily by a bankruptcy
judge if he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and if it was committed in his
actual presence. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the
judge and entered of record.(2) Disposition After a Hearing. Criminal contempt which may be punished by a bank-
ruptcy judge acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1481, except when determined as provided in
paragraph (1) of this subdivision, may be punished by the bankruptcy judge only after a
hearing on notice. The notice shall be in writing, shall state the essential facts constituting
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Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not purport to
deal with civil contempt,5" Rule 9020 similarly did not address it, and
courts were directed instead to "[t]he decisional law governing the
procedure for imposition of civil sanctions by the district courts
"51
The Supreme Court stayed the effective date of its Marathon
judgment first to October 4, 1982,52 and then to December 24, 1982,11
in order to provide Congress an opportunity to respond to the deci-
sion. When Congress failed to do so by the latter deadline, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States proposed a draft "Emergency
Rule" to be adopted by the district courts which it thought would en-
able the bankruptcy court system to continue to operate in a constitu-
tional fashion.54 The Emergency Rule referred to the bankruptcy
courts "[a]ll cases under title 11 and all civil proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11," but permitted
the district court to withdraw the reference at any time.55 The Emer-
gency Rule gave the bankruptcy courts authority to perform "all acts
and duties necessary" to handle referred cases and proceedings, but it
barred them from conducting (i) proceedings to enjoin a court, (ii)
proceedings to punish criminal contempt not committed in the actual
presence of the bankruptcy judge or warranting a punishment of im-
prisonment, (iii) appeals from a decision of a bankruptcy judge, or (iv)
jury trials.56 In "related proceedings, 57 the bankruptcy court could
not, without the consent of the parties, enter a judgment or dispositive
the criminal contempt charged and describe the contempt as criminal and shall state the
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense.
The notice may be given on the court's own initiative or on application of the United States
attorney or by an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. If the contempt charged
involves disrespect or criticism of a bankruptcy judge, that judge is disqualified from presid-
ing at the hearing except with the consent of the person charged.
(3) Certification to District Court. If it appears to a bankruptcy judge that criminal con-
tempt has occurred, but the court is without power under 28 U.S.C. § 1481, to punish or to
impose the appropriate punishment for the criminal contempt the judge may certify the
facts to the district court.
(b) Right to Jury Trial. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right to jury
trial whenever it otherwise exists.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020.
50. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 provides procedural rules for courts of the
United States with respect to criminal contempt. FED. R. CRiM. P. 42.
51. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 9 COLLIER ON BANK-
RuPrcY, supra note 48, 9020.01.
52. 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982).
53. 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
54. The Emergency Rule is set out in full as an appendix to White Motor Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983). In the section dealing with "Powers of Bankruptcy Judges,"
the Rule precluded bankruptcy judges from conducting, among other things, "a proceeding to
punish a criminal contempt-(i) not committed in the bankruptcy judge's actual presence; or (ii)
warranting a punishment of imprisonment .... " Id. at 266.
55. Id. at 265-66.
56. Id. at 266.
57. Id. (defining "related proceedings" to be "those civil proceedings that, in the absence
of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a state court").
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order, but could only submit findings and a proposed judgment or or-
der to the district court.5 8 In other proceedings, the bankruptcy
court's orders and judgments were final, subject to de novo review by
the district court.59 The district court was authorized to "give no def-
erence to the findings of the bankruptcy judge," even in proceedings
that were not "related proceedings. '
In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,61 Congress adopted, with some modifications, the jurisdictional
structure of the Emergency Rule, after rejecting proposals that would
have given bankruptcy courts Article III status.62 BAFJA designates
bankruptcy judges as a "unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district, ' 63 to serve as "judicial officers of
the United States district court established under Article III of the
Constitution."'  It authorizes the courts of appeals to appoint bank-
ruptcy judges to fourteen-year terms65 and states that a bankruptcy
judge can be removed during that term "only for incompetence, mis-
conduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability. ' 66 BAFJA
permits the district courts to refer "any or all cases under title 11 and
any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11" to the bankruptcy judges. 67  Bankruptcy judges
can "hear and determine" all cases and "core proceedings '68 arising
58. Id.
59. Id. at 266-67.
60. Id.
61. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) [hereinafter BAFJA]. For a listing of the spe-
cific provisions amended by BAFJA, see 28 U.S.C. § 151 note (1988) (short title).
62. See generally Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, reprinted in 4 App. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, at xxl-xx93.
63. BAFJA § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 336 (1984) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 152(e).
67. Id. § 157(a).
68. "Core proceedings" are defined as follows:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of
the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a plan under
chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliqui-
dated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distri-
bution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims
brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate; and
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under Title 11 or arising in a case under Title 11,69 but they can only
"hear" a proceeding that is not a "core proceeding" but that is "other-
wise related to a case under title 11" and submit proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the district court,7° unless the parties
consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in such related pro-
ceedings.7 ' The district court may withdraw the reference to the
bankruptcy court, in whole or in part, "for cause shown. '72 Although
appeals from final bankruptcy court orders are taken to the district
court "in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally,
73
the district court must review de novo proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to which a party has objected in a related
proceeding.74
Congress amended Title 28 to vest "original and exclusive juris-
diction of all cases under title 11" and "original but not exclusive juris-
diction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11" in the district courts. 75 This amend-
ment effectively repealed the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bank-
ruptcy courts previously contained in Title 28.76
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment
of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims.
Id. § 157(b)(2).
69. Id. § 157(b)(1).
70. Id. § 157(c)(1).
71. Id. § 157(c)(2).
72. Id. § 157(d).
73. Id. § 158(c).
74. Id. § 157(c)(1).
75. BAFJA § 101, 98 Stat. at 333 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1334). Amended § 1334
replaces 28 U.S.C. § 1471 which granted the same jurisdiction to the district courts but provided
that the bankruptcy courts could exercise all jurisdiction conferred on the district courts.
76. See Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 113, 98 Stat. 333, 343 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151).
Pursuant to § 402(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92
Stat. 2549, 2682 (1979), certain provisions of that Act were to take effect on June 28, 1984. These
provisions included § 213 of the Act, 92 Stat. at 2661 (amending § 451 of Title 28), and § 241 of
the Act, 92 Stat. at 2668-71 (adding, among other provisions, § 1471 and § 1481 of Title 28).
Section 113 of BAFJA, 98 Stat. at 343, amended § 402(b), replacing § 402(b)'s effective date with
the words "shall not be effective."
Congress created some confusion in § 121(a) of BAFJA, when it provided that the effective
date specified in § 402(b) be replaced with "the date of enactment of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 [July 10, 19841." Despite the inconsistency between
the two provisions, it generally is accepted that § 113 effectively repealed the amendment to
§ 451 of title 28 and the addition of § 1471 and § 1481 thereto. See, e.g., Mountain Am. Credit
Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 449 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990); Plastiras v. Idell (In re
Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1987); Tele-Wire Supply Corp. v.
Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.), 55 B.R. 746, 749 n.6 (N.D. Ga.
1985); In re Galvez, 119 B.R. 849, 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Dennig, 98 B.R. 935, 938
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988), supplemented, 96 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re Stephen
W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 B.R. 377, 385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 96 B.R. 29 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 879
F.2d 856 tbl. (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989); Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68
B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Kalpana Elec., Inc., 58 B.R. 326, 333 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 48, 1 105.06[2] ("This provi-
sion, found in 28 U.S.C. § 1481, was repealed by the 1984 Amendments."). But see Better
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BAFJA also amended § 105 of the Code." The reference to the
"bankruptcy court" in clause (a) was replaced with a reference to the
" court'78 and a new clause (c) clarified that § 105 did not provide an
independent basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction apart from Title
28 of the United States Code.7 9
In 1986, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules transmit-
ted to the Judicial Conference the Bankruptcy Rule amendments re-
quired by BAFJA. Among those changes, which became effective
August 1, 1987, were revisions to Bankruptcy Rule 9020. Although
the preliminary draft of revised Rule 9020 would have required that
all motions for contempt be filed in the district court and would have
limited a bankruptcy judge to certifying the facts of a contempt to the
district court for hearing and determination, 0 the final rules provided
for the initial determination of contempt to be made by the bank-
ruptcy judge, even though "[t]he Advisory Committee recognized that
bankruptcy judges may ...not have the power to punish for con-
tempt." 81 Under revised Rule 9020, a bankruptcy judge has the power
Homes of Va., Inc. v. Budget Serv. Co., 52 B.R. 426, 430 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Congress intended
the Bankruptcy Court's civil contempt power to continue."), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1986).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (amended 1984).
78. Clause (a), as amended, reads: "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
79. The new clause (c) reads, in its entirety:
The ability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a district court to exercise
any of the authority or responsibilities conferred upon the court under this title shall be
determined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge, officer, or employee set
forth in title 28. This subsection shall not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy judges and
other officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title 28 from its operation.
Id. § 105(c).
80. See In re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc., 62 B.R. 910, 914 n.4 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (describing
new proposed Rule 9020 and noting that it had "received considerable critical comment" for
resolving constitutional and statutory questions by rule); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom
(In re Continental Air Lines, Inc.), 61 B.R. 758, 775 n.35 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (quoting pro-
posed Rule 9020's Committee Note that states "there is no statutory authority for [bankruptcy
judges] to exercise the contempt power").
81. Letter from Morey L. Sear, on behalf of Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, to
Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (June 13, 1986) in Preface to 1995-2 COLLIER PAM-
PHLET EDrION BANKRuPTCY RULES at lxxxvii-lxxxviii (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.). The Advi-
sory Committee Note to the amended Rule 9020 reads:
The United States Bankruptcy Courts, as constituted under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, were courts of law, equity and admiralty with an inherent contempt power, but
former 28 U.S.C. § 1481 restricted the criminal contempt power of bankruptcy judges.
Under the 1984 amendments, bankruptcy judges are judicial officers of the district court, 28
U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(a)(1). There are no decisions by the courts of appeals concerning the
authority of bankruptcy judges to punish for either civil or criminal contempt under the
1984 amendments. This rule, as amended, recognizes that bankruptcy judges may not have
the power to punish for contempt.
Sound judicial administration requires that the initial determination of whether con-
tempt has been committed should be made by the bankruptcy judge. If timely objections
are not filed to the bankruptcy judge's order, the order has the same force and effect as an
order of the district court. If objections are filed within 10 days of service of the order, the
district court conducts a de novo review pursuant to Rule 9033 and any order of contempt is
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summarily to punish contempt committed in his or her presence.82 A
bankruptcy judge may determine other contempt after notice and a
hearing. If the party found in contempt does not object to the bank-
ruptcy court's order of contempt within ten days after service of the
order, the order has the same force and effect as a district court order.
If objections are filed, the district court reviews the order as provided
in Rule 9033(b). 3
At the same time that the Bankruptcy Rules were being
amended, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. s4 The purpose
of the law was to provide for the appointment of additional bank-
ruptcy judges and to implement the United States trustee program of
bankruptcy administration on a nationwide basis.8 5 In Subtitle A of
Title II of that Act, entitled "Activities of United States Trustees,"
Congress amended § 105(a) of the Code to include the following
sentence:
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a
party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination neces-
entered by the district court on completion of the court's review of the bankruptcy judge's
order.
1995-2 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRuPrcY RuLEs, supra, at 454.
82. Rule 9020, as amended in 1987 (and further amended in 1991 in a nonsubstantive way),
states:
Contempt Proceedings
(a) Contempt Committed in Presence of Bankruptcy Judge. Contempt committed in
the presence of a bankruptcy judge may be determined summarily by a bankruptcy judge.
The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the bankruptcy judge and
entered of record.
(b) Other Contempt Contempt committed in a case or proceeding pending before a
bankruptcy judge, except when determined as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule, may
be determined by the bankruptcy judge only after a hearing on notice. The notice shall be
in writing, shall state the essential facts constituting the contempt charged and describe the
contempt as criminal or civil and shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reason-
able time for the preparation of the defense. The notice may be given on the court's own
initiative or on application of the United States attorney or by an attorney appointed by the
court for that purpose. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a
bankruptcy judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing except with the
consent of the person charged.
(c) Service and Effective Date of Order; Review. The clerk shall serve forthwith a copy
of the order of contempt on the entity named therein. The order shall be effective 10 days
after service of the order and shall have the same force and effect as an order of contempt
entered by the district court unless, within the 10 day period, the entity named therein
serves and files objections prepared in the manner provided in Rule 9033(b). If timely ob-
jections are filed, the order shall be reviewed as provided in Rule 9033.
(d) Right to Jury Trial. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right to
jury trial whenever it otherwise exists.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020.
83. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033(b) (specifying the procedures for review of proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law in noncore proceedings).
84. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 764, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5227.
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sary or appropriate to enforce or inplement court orders or rules,
or to prevent an abuse of process. '
This amendment, like all of Subtitle A of Title II of the Act, became
effective for particular judicial districts as those districts entered the
permanent United States Trustee system. 7
IV. FINDING CONTEMPT POWER-A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS
BAFJA's elimination of both § 1481 and the amendment to § 451,
which generally had been thought to provide the primary statutory
basis for the contempt powers of the bankruptcy court, left unresolved
the issue of whether bankruptcy courts could exercise contempt
power. The amended Bankruptcy Code no longer mentioned the
word "contempt."
Courts confronting the contempt issue in the post-BAFJA era
have faced the following questions. First, do the bankruptcy courts
continue to have statutory authority to exercise civil or criminal con-
tempt power? If not, do they have inherent power to do so? If they
have statutory and/or inherent power, would the exercise of such
power violate Article III of the Constitution as interpreted in Mara-
thon? Most courts which have threaded their way through this thicket
of issues have come to the pragmatic,88 but intellectually unsatisfying,
conclusion that bankruptcy courts have the power to cite for civil con-
tempt, but not for criminal contempt.
A. Legislative Authority for the Contempt Power
Although courts continued to rely on § 1481 of Title 28 of the
United States Code as the basis for contempt orders even after the
Marathon decision,89 the BAFJA amendments necessitated a new
86. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100 Stat. 3088, 3097 (1986) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (1994)).
87. Id. § 302(d), 100 Stat. at 3119-20 (amended 1990). Section 302 was amended by § 317
of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115-16, to
make the amendment to § 105(a) "effective as of the date of the enactment of the Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 [the name given to Title II of the Judicial
Improvement Act by section 301 thereof]."
88. For example; in expressing puzzlement at the conclusion of some courts that bank-
ruptcy judges lack contempt power, one bankruptcy judge said that "the consequences of such
decisions on the workload of the U.S. District Court and the litigation delays necessarily in-
volved mean that the result [of such decisions] will be more serious than merely puzzling." In re
Taylor, 59 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986).
89. See, e.g., In re Bennett, 41 B.R. 958, 959-60 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) (criminal contempt
certified to district court under § 1481 and Rule 9020(a)(3)); In re Damon, 40 B.R. 367, 374
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (civil contempt); Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (civil contempt); cf Hicks v. Pearlstein
(In re Magwood), 785 F.2d 1077, 1078 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to resolve "whether there
existed statutory or regulatory authorization for the exercise of the power to issue civil contempt
during the effect of the Interim Rule"); Sunderstorm Mortgage Co. v. 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Part-
nership (In re 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership), 41 B.R. 540, 546 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) (impos-
ing sanctions for civil contempt based on "inherent power" of the court).
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analysis of the power's source. The circuit court that first confronted
the issue concluded that after BAFJA bankruptcy courts lacked statu-
tory authority to exercise the power of contempt. In Plastiras v. Idell
(In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd. ),9 the Ninth Circuit initially noted
the absence of an express statutory provision granting contempt pow-
ers to bankruptcy courts. It then considered whether such powers
could be inferred from § 105 of Title 11 and § 157 of Title 28 of the
United States Code.91 After reviewing the history of the contempt
power in bankruptcy courts, the court turned to the definition of "core
proceedings" in § 157(b)(2). It found no indication that a contempt
proceeding fell within the definition of a core proceeding, nor could
the court find implicit jurisdiction based on the grant of power over
the core proceeding out of which the contempt arose.92 Dismissing
the argument that § 105 provided an independent source for the con-
tempt power, the court noted that the jurisdictional limits of § 105 are
set forth in Title 28. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit thought it unlikely
that Congress would have granted to bankruptcy courts contempt
powers that were less limited in scope than those exercised by Article
I courts, Article III courts, and Congress itself.93 Concluding that "[i]f
Congress had intended that bankruptcy judges should possess such
power, it well knew how to confer it," 94 the court held that the bank-
ruptcy court had no statutory authority to issue the contempt order
before it.95
90. 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987).
91. Id. at 1284. The court noted that Rule 9020, jurisdictionally based on repealed § 1481,
could not be construed as authority for the exercise of contempt powers. Id. at 1288-89.
92. Id. at 1289; see also United States v. Richardson (In re Richardson), 85 B.R. 1008, 1022
n.29 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (dictum); United States v. Dowell (In re Dowell), 82 B.R. 998,
1006 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), remanded, 95 B.R. 690 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (clarifying that a
bankruptcy court has the authority initially to render independent factual and legal decisions
relative to contempt); Omega Equip. Corp. v. John C. Louis Co., Inc. (In re Omega Equip.
Corp.), 51 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985) (finding a contempt proceeding in bankruptcy to
be a "related" proceeding); Wesley Medical Ctr. v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 46 B.R. 802, 806
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (civil contempt is a related proceeding in bankruptcy); cf. I.A. Durbin,
Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1548 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986) (assuming arguendo for
purposes of appeal that contempt proceeding is core and thus has res judicata and collateral
estoppel effect, but noting that courts have disagreed on issue). See generally Jon C. Sogn, Com-
ment, In re Krisle: Civil Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 31 S.D. L. REv. 273 (1986)
(arguing that civil contempt must be considered part of the main cause, a core proceeding).
93. Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1290. The limitations on Article I courts cited by the Ninth Circuit
included those imposed on the contempt powers of courts-martial, 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1994), the
Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c) (1988), and the Article I territorial courts of Guam, GuAM Cv.
PRoc. CODE §§ 1209-1222 (1970). The court also cited the limitations on the contempt powers
of United States magistrates, 28 U.S.C. § 636(d) (1988) (now § 636(e)), and Congress, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 192, 194 (1994). 827 F.2d at 1290 n.16.
94. 827 F.2d at 1290.
95. See also In re Keane, 110 B.R. 477, 482 (S.D. Cal. 1990); In re General Associated
Investors Ltd. Partnership, 159 B.R. 551, 556 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc.,
99 B.R. 16, 18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (following Sequoia); cf. In re University Medical Ctr. v.
Sullivan, 125 B.R. 121, 126 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992) (suggesting, in
dictum, that the enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), providing for an award of damages to an
individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay, may evidence congressional recog-
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Those courts that continued to find civil contempt power in the
bankruptcy courts nonetheless derived that power from § 105 and
§ 157. Immediately after its amendment in BAFJA, § 105(a) of the
Code authorized a bankruptcy court to issue any order, process or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of the Code. In 1986, Congress again amended the section to add a
second sentence making reference to actions "necessary or appropri-
ate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an
abuse of process."96 The Fourth Circuit, in the leading case of Burd v.
Walters (In re Walters),97 found that the "plain meaning" of § 105(a)
conferred the power to hold a party in civil contempt.98
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Mountain America Credit Union v.
Skinner (In re Skinner)99 determined that the language of § 105(a)
was unambiguous. It concluded, based on the "plain language of the
Section," that Congress conferred civil contempt power on bank-
ruptcy courts. 100 However, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the court in
Skinner recognized that the powers of the bankruptcy court under
§ 105(a) are limited by the jurisdictional grant of § 157.101 Citing the
decisions of a number of other courts which had so held, the court
nition that BAFJA eliminated statutory contempt power for bankruptcy courts). But see John-
son Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing with
approval language in Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that bankruptcy courts may cite violators of
automatic stay for civil contempt)); Wagner v. Piper Indus., Inc. (In re Wagner), 87 B.R. 612, 616
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (interpreting Sequoia to permit compliance with Rule 9020 procedure);
but cf. United States v. Arkinson (In re Cascade Rds., Inc.), 34 F.3d 756, 767 (9th Cir. 1994)
(remanding for consideration of civil contempt by bankruptcy court, but expressing "no opinion
at this time on the way in which the bankruptcy court, if it chooses to do so, could impose such
sanctions"); Chugach Timber Corp. v. Northern Stevedoring & Handling Corp. (In re Chugach
Forest Prods., Inc.), 23 F.3d 241, 244 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding to permit bankruptcy court
to exercise discretion with respect to "damages" as a "sanction for willful violations of the stay");
Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890,904 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) (finding power to award
sanctions, as opposed to citing for contempt, under § 105), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 56
F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.), amended on reh'g, 67 F.3d 187 (9th Cir. 1995); Costa v. Welch (In re Costa),
172 B.R. 954, 963 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) ("The tea leaves say that bankruptcy judges have
muscle in contempt matters even if their orders might not be final.").
96. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994); see also supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
97. 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 669. Waiters interpreted § 105 as it existed prior to its 1986 amendment.
99. 917 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 447. Although the court in Skinner dealt with the amended version of § 105, it
placed no particular emphasis on the new language. Other cases have found the 1986 amend-
ment critical to their analysis. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 949
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) ("The introduction of the new language to § 105(a) injects one element
which did not exist previously: clear statutory authority."); see also Kellogg v. Chester, 71 B.R.
36, 37 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 333 & n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988), supplemented, 96 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 88 B.R.
566, 571 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1988); Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 B.R.
377,385-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 96 B.R. 29 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 879 F.2d 856 tbl. (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989). See generally William Greendyke, Contempt Power in Bank-
ruptcy Court- Is There More Than Sound and Fury?, 20 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 1161, 1174-76 (1989)
(finding in §.105 an express statutory basis for civil contempt power).
101. 917 F.2d at 447-48; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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concluded that a civil contempt proceeding arising out of a core mat-
ter is itself a core matter within the meaning of § 157 and, therefore, is
within the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court.10 2
Most cases following Walters and Skinner or their predecessors
add little to the statutory analysis. 10 3 Those that have moved beyond
the circuit courts have found additional authority for the imposition of
civil contempt sanctions in Bankruptcy Rule 9020, explicitly or implic-
itly concluding that its approval by Congress evidenced congressional
intent that bankruptcy courts have the powers described therein."°
102. 917 F.2d at 448 (citing Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc. (In re Better
Homes of Va., Inc.), 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986)); Haile v. New York State Higher Educ.
Servs. Corp., 90 B.R. 51, 54 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Kellogg v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 38 (N.D. Tex.
1987); In re Stephen W. Grosse, P.C., 84 B.R. at 386; Miller v. Mayer (In re Miller), 81 B.R. 669,
677 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
103. See, e.g., Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Dalton, 25 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fed-
eration of Puerto Rican Orgs. v. Howe, 157 B.R. 206, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Steele Farms,
No. 93-1030 PFK, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18624, at *16 (D. Kan. Dec. 29. 1993); In re Schatz, 122
B.R. 327, 328-29 (N.D. I11. 1990); In re Spanish River Plaza Realty Co., 155 B.R. 249, 251 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1993); Braun v. Champion Credit Union (In re Braun), 141 B.R. 133, 140 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio), amendment denied, 141 B.R. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
152 B.R. 466 (N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Snider Farms, Inc., 125 B.R. 993, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1991); In re Prairie Trunk Ry., 125 B.R. 217,222 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank, 173 B.R. 146 (N.D. 11. 1992); In re Shuma, 124 B.R.
668, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Richie (In re
Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc.), 121 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); In re
Kampmann & Co., No. 5-89-00374, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 498, at *3-4 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 19,
1990); In re Hicks, 119 B.R. 55, 58 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990); Colon v. Hart (In re Colon), 114 B.R.
890, 896 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990), appeal dismissed sub nom. Szostek v. Hart, 123 B.R. 719
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 941 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Berry, No. 89-
20108-C-13, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2707, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. May 18, 1989) (dictum); First
Republicbank Corp. v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank (In re First Republicbank Corp.), 113 B.R. 277,
279 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (dictum); In re Patterson, 111 B.R. 395, 397 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Michael Fox Auctioneers, Inc. (In re Galleria Enters. of Md., Ltd.), 102
B.R. 472, 474 & n.1 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 417 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1989);
In re Armstrong, 99 B.R. 713,714 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Cordova Gonzalez, 99 B.R. 188,
191 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1989); Schewe v. Fairview Estates (In re Schewe), 94 B.R. 938, 946-47
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (dictum);
Bowen v. Residential Fin. Corp. (In re Bowen), 89 B.R. 800,807 n.10 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In
re Barbour, 77 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987); Sun City Clinic of Chiropractic, Inc. v.
Helvig (In re Helvig), 74 B.R. 204,205 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987); In re Derryberry, 72 B.R. 874, 884
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Elegant Concepts, Ltd., 67 B.R. 914, 918 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986); Michalski v. State Bank & Trust (In re Taco Ed's, Inc.), 63 B.R. 913, 930 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1986); In re Shafer, 63 B.R. 194, 197 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 54
B.R. 252, 253 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1985); In re Depew, 51 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985);
cf Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183,
186-87 (2d Cir. 1990) (debtors who are not natural persons are not entitled to damages under 11
U.S.C. § 362(h), but for them "contempt proceedings are the proper means of compensation and
punishment for willful violations of the automatic stay") (dictum); Tele-Wire Supply Corp. v.
Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.), 55 B.R. 746,749-51 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(finding statutory authority, but concluding that exercise of authority is unconstitutional); Mack
v. Department of Public Welfare (In re Mack), 46 B.R. 652,656-57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (find-
ing creditor in contempt for violating automatic stay, relying on pre-Marathon cases).
104. See, e.g., Eck v. Dodge Chem. Co. (In re Power Recovery Sys., Inc.), 950 F.2d 798, 802
(1st Cir. 1991); Bartel v. Shugrue (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 171 B.R. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Commercial Banking Co. v. Jones (In re Maxair Aircraft Corp. of Ga., Inc.), 148 B.R. 353, 358
(M.D. Ga. 1992); In re United States Abatement Corp., 150 B.R. 381, 388 (Bankr. E.D. La.),
vacated, 152 B.R. 78 (Bankr. E.D. La.), aff'd, 157 B.R. 278 (E.D. La. 1993); In re Stutzman, 151
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Other courts, even if they are inclined to follow Walters and Skinner,
simply certify the facts of contempt to the district court rather than
raise an issue as to their authority.105 Still others have held parties in
contempt either without citing any statutory authority'0 6 or merely cit-
ing Rule 9020.1°7
With respect to criminal contempt, courts have reached more
consistent conclusions. Perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid adopt-
ing an interpretation that might be subject to constitutional chal-
lenge, °8 courts have held that, because a criminal contempt charge is
B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); Stockschlaeder & McDonald v. Kittay (In re Stock-
bridge Funding Corp.), 145 B.R. 797, 804 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 158 B.R. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Carney & Sons Trucking Servs., Inc., 142 B.R. 497, 499
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); Georgia Scale Co. v. Toledo Scale Corp. (In re Georgia Scale Co.), 134
B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991); In re Taborski, Nos. 88-B-1624, 89-A-587, 1991 Bankr.
LEXIS 1393, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. I1. Sept. 16, 1991), aff'd on other grounds, 141 B.R. 959 (N.D.
111. 1992); Fry v. Today's Homes, Inc. (In re Fry), 122 B.R. 427, 430-31 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990);
In re Galvez, 119 B.R. 849, 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Esposito, 119 B.R. 305, 307
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Dennig, 98 B.R. 935, 938-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); Kemira, Inc.
v. Miller (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 95 B.R. 860, 863 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989), vacated, 910
F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1990); Kiker v. United States (In re Kiker), 98 B.R. 103, 108-09 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1988); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 675-76 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (dictum); Hamilton Allied
Corp. v. Kerhau Mfg. Co. (In re Hamilton Allied Corp.), 87 B.R. 43,46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988);
In re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc., 62 B.R. 910, 914 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); cf. United States v. Revie,
834 F.2d 1198, 1205 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988) (suggesting in dictum
that the issue of a bankruptcy court's "authority to make contempt rulings will be settled soon by
proposed Bankruptcy Rule 9020, in which Congress will explicitly grant that authority in speci-
fied circumstances"); In re Duggan, 133 B.R. 671, 673-74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (interpreting
Rule 9020 to characterize civil contempt motions as noncore proceedings, but finding it
nondeterminative).
105. See, e.g., Stein & Day, Inc. v. Coordinated Sys. & Servs. Corp. (In re Stein & Day, Inc.),
83 B.R. 221, 226 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Taylor, 59 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986);
In re Kalpana Elecs., Inc., 58 B.R. 326, 335 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); cf. In re Ruggirello, No. 93-
C-7792, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8348, at *5 (N.D. I11. June 21, 1994) (declining to decide whether
bankruptcy court, which denied motion for contempt on the basis of lack of authority, was cor-
rect because facts did not support contempt).
106. See, e.g., In re Village Craftsman, Inc., 160 B.R. 740, 748-49 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993)
(mem.); Soiett v. United States Veterans' Admin., 92 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988); Behr-
ens v. Woodhaven Ass'n, 87 B.R. 971, 976 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, Nos. 88-C-8855, 83-B-
4896, 1989 WL 47409, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. 11. Mar. 8, 1989); cf In re Elias, 98 B.R. 332, 337 (N.D.
I11. 1989) (affirming contempt citation, noting that appellant did not challenge statutory or con-
stitutional power of bankruptcy court).
107. See, e.g., In re Ashley, 97 B.R. 391, 394 (N.D. I11. 1989) (affirming contempt order); In
re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 615 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
108. See Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[O]ur
conclusion is nevertheless influenced by the perception that the constitutionality of the contrary
position is subject to substantial question").
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
not a "core proceeding" within the meaning of § 157,109 a bankruptcy
court cannot enter a final order." 0
B. Inherent Power to Punish for Contempt
Although unnecessary to their holdings, most courts that have
found implicit statutory authority in § 105 and § 157 for a bankruptcy
court's exercise of the civil contempt power also have invoked the "in-
herent power" of the bankruptcy court to enforce compliance with its
orders."' These courts find such inherent authority in any "court,"
109. See, e.g., id. at 1518; Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281,
1289 (9th Cir. 1987); Bratton v. Williams (In re Bratton), 117 B.R. 430, 437 (W.D. Ark. 1990); In
re Brown, 94 B.R. 526, 534-35 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1988); Yaquinto v. Greer, 81 B.R. 870, 881 (N.D.
Tex. 1988); Tele-Wire Supply Corp. v. Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re Industrial Tool Distribs.,
Inc.), 55 B.R. 746, 750 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Better Homes of Va., Inc. v. Budget Serv. Co. (In re
Better Homes of Va., Inc.), 52 B.R. 426, 430 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1986) (dictum); cf. United States v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1992);
Hubbard v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 810 F.2d 778, 781 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987); Commercial Banking Co.
v. Jones (In re Maxair Aircraft Corp. of Ga., Inc.), 148 B.R. 353, 358 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (finding it
unnecessary to resolve issue of bankruptcy court's criminal contempt power).
110. The major controversy with respect to criminal contempt revolves around whether the
bankruptcy court can, consistent with amended Rule 9020, hold a hearing and issue an order
which, in the absence of objections, becomes final, or whether the bankruptcy court must certify
the facts to the district court for a hearing in that venue. Under the 1983 version of Rule 9020,
see supra note 49, it was clear that certification of all criminal contempts outside the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was required. See, e.g., In re Industrial Tool Distribs.,
Inc., 55 B.R. at 750; Craig v. Clifford (In re Crabtree), 47 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
Although the procedures provided in the current version of Rule 9020, see supra note 82, have
been approved by several courts as statutorily authorized, see, e.g., Brown v. Ramsay (In re
Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1178-80 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Revie, 834 F.2d 1198, 1206 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); In re Brown, 94 B.R. 526, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988); Midwest Properties No. Two v. Big Hill Inv. Co., 93 B.R. 357, 365-66 (N.D. Tex. 1988), in
Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1519-20 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that Rule 9020 prescribed procedures only for contempt matters over which bankruptcy
courts otherwise had jurisdiction and (because they had no jurisdiction over criminal contempt
matters) criminal contempt must be heard by the district court. See also Arkos Installations, Inc.
v. Grand Nat'l Bank (In re Arkos Installations, Inc.), 834 F.2d 1526, 1527 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987)
("[T]he bankruptcy judge must certify the facts to the district court to determine whether to
issue the order."); In re Lawrence, 164 B.R. 73, 76 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction to conduct criminal contempt hearing and enter order under Rule
9020); In re Sasson Jeans, Inc., 80 B.R. 289, 295 & n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (certifying pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court "is in accord with accepted
procedure"), certification set aside, 104 B.R. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
111. See, e.g., Utah State Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 90 B.R. 470,476 (D. Utah
1988) ("[T]he current version of the Bankruptcy Code implicitly recognizes the inherent con-
tempt powers of the bankruptcy court in Section 105(a)."); In re United States Abatement
Corp., 150 B.R. 381, 388 (Bankr. E.D. La.), vacated, 152 B.R. 78 (Bankr. E.D. La.), aff'd, 157
B.R. 278 (E.D. La. 1993) ("The [civil contempt] powers are arguably inherent in the bankruptcy
courts, but are definitely provided for by Section 105 and Bankruptcy Rule 9020."); Stock-
schalaeder & McDonald v. Kittay (In re Stockbridge Funding Corp.), 145 B.R. 797, 804 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 158 B.R. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("A bankruptcy
court's contempt power is recognized by statute ... and has been acknowledged or simply as-
sumed to subsist in various non-Article III tribunals."); Georgia Scale Co. v. Toledo Scale Corp.
(In re Georgia Scale Co.), 134 B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991) ("The bankruptcy court has an
inherent power of civil contempt," citing § 105(a) and Rule 9020.); Fry v. Today's Home (In re
Fry), 122 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) ("[Mlost courts held that bankruptcy courts
could punish for contempt without reference to any statutory authority."); Jim Nolker Chevro-
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whether created as an Article III court or not, concluding, as one
court put it, that "judicial power to issue an order carries with it the
power to enforce such order.""' 2
Rejecting this analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Sequoia"' found that
the source of the inherent power of contempt lies in Article III of the
Constitution. Bankruptcy courts, created "pursuant to [Congress's]
substantive authority over bankruptcies" in Article I, section 8, of the
Constitution, cannot derive inherent contempt power from Article
let-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Richie (In re Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc.), 121
B.R. 20, 22 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) ("[T]he Supreme Court has noted on numerous occa-
sions that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts."); In re Galvez, 119 B.R.
849, 850 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) ("This Court ... is satisfied that non-Article III courts have
inherent power to enforce the lawful court orders issued in a proceeding over which the court
had jurisdiction, even absent specific statutory authorization .... However ... this Court...
finds such authority in § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Esposito, 119 B.R. 305, 307
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) ("[T]his Court is satisfied that it has the inherent power and an implied
statutory power pursuant to § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to find one in civil contempt."); In re
Cordova Gonzalez, 99 B.R. 188, 191 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1989) (noting that "[t]he judiciary has the
inherent power to punish contempt to vindicate its own authority" within jurisdiction of 28
U.S.C. § 157); In re Miller, 81 B.R. 669, 676 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) ("it is fair to conclude that
all courts, whether created pursuant to Article I or Article III of the Constitution, do have inher-
ent civil contempt power to enforce compliance with their lawful judicial orders, and no specific
statute is required to invest a court with civil contempt power," but finding "ample authority to
exercise civil contempt power based on sec[tion] 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, albeit by implica-
tion"); In re Derryberry, 72 B.R. 874, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (finding that the court has
inherent contempt powers in addition to power under § 105); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 68 B.R.
690, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[Tlhe power of the bankruptcy court to issue an order of civil
contempt is derived from three sources: the inherent power of a court, including an Article I
court, the reference of the inherent power of the district court, and the statutory grant contained
in 11 U.S.C. § 105."); In re Shafer, 63 B.R. 194, 197 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986) ("The contempt
power is inherent in all courts .... Title 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) codifies the contempt powers of
bankruptcy courts."); In re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc., 62 B.R. 910, 912 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) ("The
power of civil contempt inherent in the judicial responsibilities of the bankruptcy judge is recog-
nized by statute, 11 U.S.C. section 105(a), by rule, Bankruptcy Rule 9020, and has been acknowl-
edged or simply assumed to subsist in various non-Article III tribunals.") (footnote omitted); cf.
In re Silver, 46 B.R. 772, 774 n.2 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding that a bankruptcy court had inherent
power to award fees for contempt; no authority cited); Goodman v. NLRB (In re Goodman), 81
B.R. 786, 794 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 90 B.R. 56 (W.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 873 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that "bankruptcy courts are
possessed with inherent contempt powers to enforce compliance with their orders"); In re Ken-
nedy, 80 B.R. 673 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) (relying on inherent powers, finding "no specific statute
is required to give a court that civil contempt power"); In re Bloomer-Fiske Indus., Inc., 77 B.R.
658, 661 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("this Court is of the opinion that the Bankruptcy court has
the inherent power to issue civil contempt orders"; no statutory authority found); American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan (In re Moyer), 51 B.R. 302, 308 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) ("The
contempt sanction is the most prominent of the Court's inherent powers," citing FED. R. CIv. P.
37.). See generally Greendyke, supra note 100, at 1174-76; Ron Weiss, Contempt Power of the
Bankruptcy Court, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 205, 234-42 (1989) (concluding that bankruptcy courts have
inherent contempt power and that such power is constitutional); Richard C. Howard, Jr., Com-
ment, Contempt Power and the Bankruptcy Courts: The New Trend, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 335,
346-51 (1989).
112. Kemira, Inc. v. Miller (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 95 B.R. 860, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1989), vacated, 910 F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1990).
113. Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).
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III.114 Absent statutory authority for the contempt power (which the
court did not find), the Ninth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy
courts lacked jurisdiction to exercise such power. 115
As in the case of statutory authority, all courts agree that bank-
ruptcy courts lack inherent criminal contempt power.11 6
C. Constitutionality of the Contempt Power
Having concluded that a bankruptcy court has no statutory or in-
herent authority to exercise the civil contempt power, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Sequoia expressly declined to decide the constitutional issue of
whether the exercise of such power would be constitutional.117 How-
ever, other courts have confronted the issue, either because they con-
cluded that Congress has conferred the power pursuant to § 105 and
§ 157 (or had recognized the preexisting inherent power of the bank-
ruptcy court to cite for contempt) or because the constitutional issue
informed their statutory analysis, leading them to conclude that no
legislative authority existed.
Those courts finding statutory authority for the contempt power
are, not surprisingly, most likely to find the exercise of such authority
consistent with the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, as
interpreted in Marathon. They have reached that conclusion in three
different ways. Some courts read Marathon narrowly, noting that it
merely precluded the bankruptcy courts from exercising jurisdiction
over certain state-law claims."18 These courts find, as one stated, that
the enforcement of bankruptcy court orders are "at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power and therefore . . . of a 'public rights'
nature." 19
114. Id. at 1284; see also Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1513 (5th Cir.
1990) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that Article III is the source of inherent power to punish
contempt).
115. 827 F.2d at 1284; see also Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987)
("[C]ontempt power is inherent in Article III courts, but must be expressly granted to Article I
courts."); United States v. Jenkins (In re Richardson), 52 B.R. 527, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)
("[T]here is no such inherent contempt power residing in the bankruptcy court.").
116. See, e.g., In re Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1511 ("[B]ankruptcy courts do not have inherent crimi-
nal contempt powers, at least with respect to the criminal contempts not committed in (or near)
their presence.") (citation omitted); Tele-Wire Supply Corp. v. Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re
Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.), 55 B.R. 746, 750 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1985) ("[T]he court does not
believe that the Bankruptcy Court has inherent criminal contempt powers."); In re Kennedy, 80
B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) ("This court has no criminal jurisdiction.").
117. 827 F.2d at 1289-90 n.15.
118. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
119. Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 951 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); see also
Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 670 (4th Cir. 1989) (determination of contempt
"does not involve private rights under non-bankruptcy law"); In re Schatz, 122 B.R. 327, 330
(N.D. II1. 1990) (stating that the right to discharge is "created by federal statute" and is "not a
private, or state-created right like that in issue in Marathon;" if a court can order discharge, it
can decide if party is in contempt of that order); Kellogg v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 38 (N.D. Tex.
1987) (determination of contempt "would involve no determination of private rights under non-
bankruptcy law"); Better Homes of Va., Inc. v. Budget Serv. Co. (In re Better Homes of Va.,
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In a similar vein, some courts assume that BAFJA solved any
constitutional concerns about bankruptcy court jurisdiction and that
bankruptcy courts constitutionally can exercise power over "core"
proceedings. Having determined that the statutory basis for the con-
tempt power is § 157 and that contempt proceedings are "core," these
courts conclude that bankruptcy court jurisdiction over contempt pro-
ceedings is constitutional. 120
Finally, some courts conclude that the 1987 version of Rule 9020
"adequately address[es]" the constitutional concerns.' 2 ' Thus, any
contempt proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rule pass
constitutional muster.12
2
Those courts reaching the contrary conclusion generally have fol-
lowed the leading case of Lindsey v. Cryts (In re Cox Cotton Co. ),123
which was reversed on other grounds by the Eighth Circuit. 124 In an
opinion characterized by the court of appeals as "thorough" and "ana-
lytical,"' 25 Chief District Judge Eisele concluded that Congress cannot
freely confer the contempt power because it flows with the "judicial
power of the United States" under Article III of the Constitution.
126
Thus, if a court is not established pursuant to Article III, "it could not
possess the contempt power.' 1 27 To find otherwise, Judge Eisele con-
cluded, would "conflict with the doctrine of separation of powers, dis-
regard the awesome nature of the contempt power itself, subvert its
inherently judicial character, and seriously undermine the fundamen-
tal policies which underlie Article III.''128
With respect to separation of powers, Judge Eisele noted that the
contempt power is inherently judicial in nature.'29 "If Congress could
Inc.), 52 B.R. 426, 431 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986)
(contempt order was "issue of purely federal law," and "did not concern a right independent of,
or antecedent to the debtor's bankruptcy").
120. See, e.g., In re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc., 62 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (civil
contempt power is derived by reference from Article III court, exercised only within core pro-
ceedings and subject to appellate review, thus meeting or exceeding constitutional require-
ments); cf. Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Amalgamated Trust & Sav. Bank (In re Memorial
Estates, Inc.), 116 B.R. 108, 111 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (bankruptcy court assessment of Rule 9011
sanctions is a core proceeding); In re Crum, 55 B.R. 455, 458-59 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (viola-
tion of the automatic stay provision is a "core proceeding"); In re Depew, 51 B.R. 1010, 1013
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (contempt proceeding is a "core proceeding").
121. Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), supplemented,
96 B.R. 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
122. See In re Shuma, 124 B.R. 668, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Assaf, 119 B.R. 465,
467 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 B.R. 377, 387-88
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 96 B.R. 29 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 879 F.2d 856 tbl. (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
123. 24 B.R. 930 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
124. Lindsey v. Ipock, 732 F.2d 619.(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
125. Id. at 623.
126. In re Cox Cotton Co., 24 B.R. at 945.
127. Id. at 946.
128. Id. at 947-48.
129. Id. at 948, 950.
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vest the contempt power freely in any body it so chose, the judicial
nature of the power would clearly be abrogated and the judicial
branch of the government would likewise be subverted.' 130 The "on-
erous" nature of contempt and the need to protect parties from abuse
or oppressive conduct also justify reserving the contempt power to the
judicial branch.' 31 Finally, the court noted that Article III not only
insures the independence and integrity of the federal judiciary by pro-
tecting it from "improper influences"'1 32 but also guarantees an indi-
vidual "the right to have a controversy resolved or a punishment
imposed by an Article III judge.'13 3 To allow a bankruptcy judge to
exercise the contempt power would undermine these Article III
principles.' 34
In order to avoid finding that Congress had conferred Article III
powers upon bankruptcy courts in violation of the Constitution, those
courts persuaded by the reasoning in Cox found that a contempt hear-
ing is not a core proceeding within the meaning of § 157; thus, the
bankruptcy court could not enter a final order. 35 Nevertheless, one
court reached the conclusion that a civil contempt order, resulting
from the failure of a party to comply with an order of the bankruptcy
court in a core proceeding, is itself within the statutory power of the
court under § 157, but the court held that this legislative delegation to
the bankruptcy court is unconstitutional. 36
V. CIVIL CONTEMPT--A NEW ANALYSIS
As indicated in the discussion in section IV, the overwhelming
majority of courts considering the issue have found that bankruptcy
courts have statutory and/or inherent power to cite parties for civil
contempt and that the exercise of such power is consistent with consti-
tutional constraints. Their analysis, however, misapprehends the na-
ture of the so-called bankruptcy courts after the BAFJA amendments,
misreads statutory language and history in such a way as unnecessarily
to engender a constitutional issue, and ignores the cautions of Mara-
130. Id. at 948.
131. Id. at 949.
132. Id. at 950.
133. Id. at 951.
134. Id. at 952; see also R&M Porter Farms, Inc. v. Green Hills Prods. Credit Ass'n (In re
R & M Porter Farms, Inc.), 38 B.R. 88, 91-92 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (following Cox).
135. See, e.g., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In re Continental Air Lines, Inc.), 61
B.R. 758, 773 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Omega Equip. Corp. v. John C. Louis Co., Inc. (In re Omega
Equip. Corp.), 51 B.R. 569, 574 (D.D.C. 1985); In re MAB Foods, Inc., 49 B.R. 73, 75 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); cf United States v. Jenkins (In re Richardson), 52 B.R. 527, 533-34 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985) (the power to enforce its orders is the distinguishing feature of Article III courts; if bank-
ruptcy court asserted jurisdiction over contempt or sanction proceedings, it would usurp Article
III powers).
136. Tele-Wire Supply Corp. v. Presidential Fin. Corp. (In re Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.),
55 B.R. 746, 749-51 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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thon and its Article III progeny with respect to vesting the "essential
attributes" of judicial power in non-Article III adjuncts.
A. Distinguishing Article I Courts from Adjuncts
The initial flaw in the analysis for most courts looking at the con-
tempt power of the bankruptcy court is that they begin with an incor-
rect premise-that a "court" (called the "bankruptcy court") exists
whose powers they are attempting to discern, over which a "judge"
(called the "bankruptcy judge") presides. Because Congress invoked
the terminology of judicial administration (not to mention that used in
Article III of the Constitution), these courts not surprisingly find that
the talismanic properties of the labels include certain "inherent" rights
and that those rights must be found in the statutory language, if not
explicitly, then by reference.
As discussed in section I,"3 until 1978, the label "courts of bank-
ruptcy" was merely the name given to the district and territorial courts
of the United States when exercising their bankruptcy jurisdiction. 138
Although the 1898 Act had a definition of "court" which "may include
the referee,"139 the Act separately granted jurisdiction to "courts of
bankruptcy"'14  and to "referees,"'141 not to "courts." It defined
"judge" as "a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the refe-
ree"' 42 and granted referees, the predecessors of today's bankruptcy
"judges," jurisdiction over most bankruptcy matters, "subject always
to a review by the judge.' 143
The Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms of 1973,1'"
when referring to the person performing the judicial and administra-
tive functions relating to a bankruptcy case (usually a referee but
sometimes the district court judge145) employed a new definition,
"bankruptcy judge,"' a useful drafting term to'avoid the laborious
137. See supra text accompanying notes 8-19.
138. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 1(a)(8), 30 Stat. 544 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
139. Id. § 1(a)(7), 30 Stat. at 544.
140. Id. § 2, 30 Stat. at 545.
141. Id. § 38, 30 Stat. at 555.
142. Id. § 1(a)(16), 30 Stat. at 544.
143. Id. § 38, 30 Stat. at 555.
144. These rules appear at 411 U.S. 995 (1973).
145. Bankruptcy cases automatically were referred to a referee, subject to withdrawal of the
reference, in whole or in part, by the district judge "at any time, for the convenience of parties or
other cause." Rule 102, 411 U.S. at 1003. In addition, the referee generally could not preside
over certain proceedings, including jury trials (Rules 115(b), 411 U.S. at 1011-12, and 409(c), 411
U.S. at 1053-54), contempt proceedings (Rule 920, 411 U.S. at 1100-01) and injunctions to re-
strain a court (§ 2a(15) of the 1898 Act, § 2, 30 Stat. at 545).
146. 411 U.S. at 1092 (Bankruptcy Rule 901(7)). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901
commented on the new definition as follows:
Since Rule 102 requires all bankruptcy cases to be referred, the judicial and administrative
functions assigned the court by the Act and these rules will be performed by a referee in all
but a few instances. The term "bankruptcy judge" has been employed throughout the rules
as a useful designation of the referee of the court in which a case is pending or the district
judge when he acts in lieu of a referee. The term applies to the referee or the judge when
No. 1]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
repetition of a phrase such as "the referee or the district judge, as the
case may be." This drafting convention in the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules,
however, did not purport to change the statutory appellation of "refe-
ree." In fact, the Rules themselves were replete with references to the
"referee." 147
Congress and the courts consistently misinterpreted this new defi-
nition as a change in the title of the office from "referee" to "bank-
ruptcy judge.'1 48 However, that change in nomenclature actually did
not occur until the enactment of the Code in 1978. In section 404(b)
of the Code, 49 the term of the referees in bankruptcy serving at the
time of enactment of the Code was extended at least to the end of the
transition period (March 31, 1984), and they were thereafter to serve
as, and be given the title of, "United States bankruptcy judges."'150
The bankruptcy courts created by the Code were, despite their
label as "adjuncts to the district court,"15' truly independent courts,
either issues an injunction in a bankruptcy case pursuant to § 2a(15), but the statutory provi-
sion restricting the power to enjoin a court to the judge still applies under these rules. Clar-
ity is served by distinguishing between the referee and the district judge in some rules. See,
e.g., Rule 115 which governs the hearing on a contested petition, including a jury trial when
one is requested, and Rule 920, which governs hearings in contempt proceedings.
13 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 901.01(7) (James W. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed. 1977).
147. See, e.g., Rule 102, 411 U.S. at 1003 (reference of cases); Rule 501(c), 411 U.S. at 1055
(referee's office); Rule 502, 411 U.S. at 1055 (referees' bonds); Rule 503, 411 U.S. at 1055 (re-
strictions on referees); Rule 504, 411 U.S. at 1056 (books, records, and reports of referees); Rule
505, 411 U.S. at 1056 (nepotism, influence, and interest); Rule 506, 411 U.S. at 1057 (delegation
of ministerial functions); Rule 508, 411 U.S. at 1057-58 (public access to records and papers in
bankruptcy cases); Rule 512, 411 U.S. at 1059-60 (designated depositories); Rule 801,411 U.S. at
1086-87 (manner of taking appeal); Rule 802, 411 U.S. at 1087 (time for filing notice of appeal);
Rule 803, 411 U.S. at 1088 (finality of referee's judgment or order); Rule 804, 411 U.S. at 1088
(service of the notice of appeal); Rule 805, 411 U.S. at 1088 (stay pending appeal); Rule 807, 411
U.S. at 1089 (transmission of the record); Rule 912, 411 U.S. at 1093 (oaths and affirmations);
Rule 920, 411 U.S. at 1100-01 (contempt proceedings); Rule 921, 411 U.S. at 1101 (entry of
judgment); Rule 922, 411 U.S. at 1101-02 (notice of judgment or order).
148. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 & n.28 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5970-71 ("In 1973, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ... went further to
recognize the judicial status of referees. The title of the office was changed to bankruptcy
judge."); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 n.2 (1982)
("Bankruptcy referees were redesignated as 'judges' in 1973."); Jones v. Tyson (In re Jones), 518
F.2d 678, 680 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Referees in Bankruptcy are now known as Bankruptcy
Judges."); United States v. Bernard (In re Nero), 501 F.2d 1354, 1355 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974) ("It
appears that 'bankruptcy judge' and 'referee in bankruptcy' are now interchangeable appella-
tions."); Davidson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. (In re BSC Audio, Inc.), 35 B.R. 722, 723 n.2
(W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 721 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he bankruptcy referees were redesignated
as 'judges' in 1973."); DeLeon v. Gurda Farms, Inc. (In re Gurda Farms, Inc.), 15 B.R. 868, 872
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[Bankruptcy] Judge Townsend owes his title to Rule 901(7) of the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure enacted in 1973 .... That rule simply renames, for most purposes, the
referee a 'Bankruptcy Judge.' "); In re Jonker Corp., 385 F. Supp. 327, 333 n.6 (D. Md. 1974)
("Rule 901(7) of the new Bankruptcy Rules designates the Referee as a Bankruptcy Judge.");
Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc. v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc. (In re Finevest Foods, Inc.), 143 B.R.
964, 965 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) ("The bankruptcy referees were redesignated as 'judges' in
1973 by Bankruptcy Rule 901(7).").
149. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
150. Id., 92 Stat. at 2683.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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statutorily denominated "courts of the United States,"' 52 with judges
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.153 The Code allowed them to exercise all jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy matters conferred by Congress on the district courts.'54
Moreover, Congress intended that these new bankruptcy courts "have
the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty," with limited
exceptions.' 55
It was this very independence of the bankruptcy courts that the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Marathon. Both the plural-
ity and concurring Justices agreed that the bankruptcy courts created
by the Code were not "adjuncts" in the sense of being constitutionally
able to exercise delegated authority of an Article III court.156 One of
the goals of Congress in enacting BAFJA was to attempt to remake
the bankruptcy courts as true "adjuncts" of the district court whose
authority would survive constitutional challenge.
Congress retained the labels "bankruptcy courts" and "bank-
ruptcy judges," but it changed their meanings. "Bankruptcy courts,"
instead of being "courts of record" which were "adjuncts" to the dis-
trict court, now became simply a word for "the bankruptcy judges in
regular active service," constituting "a unit of the district court."' 5 7
The "bankruptcy judge," while enjoying a judicial title, is merely "a
judicial officer of the district court" exercising jurisdiction "conferred
under this chapter,"' 58 and appointed by the United States court of
appeals covering the applicable district.159 With the repeal of section
241 of the 1978 version of the Code, 160 no grant of jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts still exists. Instead, district courts have jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases and proceedings. 6' In a section headed "Pro-
cedures," the district courts are authorized to refer such cases and
proceedings to the bankruptcy judges (not to the "bankruptcy courts")
for hearing and determination (for "cases under Title 11 and all core
proceedings") or for hearing only (for noncore proceedings "other-
wise related to a case under Title 11"1).162
In sum, just like "magistrate judges" on whom Congress con-
ferred the title of "judge" in 1990,163 bankruptcy judges are adminis-
trative functionaries, wearing black robes and bearing an exalted title,
152. Id § 451 (defining the term "courts of the United States").
153. Id. § 152.
154. See supra note 26.
155. See supra note 27.
156. See supra notes 38-41, 43 and accompanying text.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 151.
158. Id.
159. Id.§ 152.
160. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
162. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1), (c)(1).
.163. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5098, 5117.
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but functionaries nevertheless. Despite the fact that many judges re-
peatedly mislabel bankruptcy courts as "Article I courts,"'" as the
Fifth Circuit has mused, "we are unsure even that today's bankruptcy
courts are 'courts' in a generic sense not defined strictly by Article
III. ' '165 In a remarkable burst of self-effacing candor, one bankruptcy
judge wrote:
One will search in vain in the statutes for the conferring of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction on any distinct entity comprising an Article I
court. I may "be known as" a bankruptcy court but that doesn't
mean that there actually is some separate jurisprudential entity
involved-anymore than Congress can make a "pink rock-candy
mountain" actually exist just by saying so.... I am, and remain, a
humble servant and officer of an Article III court, although by
custom and practice I make bold to refer to myself as "this
Court" or "the Court" from time to time.166
Those courts that, after BAFJA, continue to search for the con-
tempt power of the bankruptcy court, as if that entity were some con-
gressionally created judicial body, are misled by titles and ignore the
reality of the amendments wrought by BAFJA. The "bankruptcy
court" is no longer a separate court. It has no existence independent
of the Article III district court and cannot have powers, statutory or
inherent, that are not derivative of the court of which it is a unit.
Therefore, if it can exercise contempt powers, it exercises not powers
of its own, but powers of the district court otherwise delegated to it as
part of the reference. 167 In essence, the bankruptcy judge wielding the
contempt power is a sheep in wolf's clothing, a "judicial officer of the
district court" exercising the authority of an Article III judge.
B. Delegation to Adjuncts Under Article III
The authority of borrowed robes is not necessarily unconstitu-
tional authority. As the analysis of the Supreme Court in Marathon
164. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Schwartzman (In re Stansbury Pop-
lar Place, Inc.), 13 F.3d 122, 128 (4th Cir. 1993); Ronit, Inc. v. Stemson Corp. (In re Block Shim
Dev. Co.-Irving), 939 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1991); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta
Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 538 (11th Cir. 1991); In re United
Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (8th Cir. 1990); Plastiras v. Idell (In re
Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1290 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1987); Monarch Life Ins. Co.
v. Ropes & Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31, 35 (D. Mass. 1994), aff'd, 65 F.3d
973 (1st Cir. 1995); Walsh v. California Commerce Bank (In re Interbank Mortgage Corp.), 128
B.R. 269, 273 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Hardesty v. Johnson, 126 B.R. 343, 344 (E.D. Mo. 1991); In re
Schatz, 122 B.R. 327, 328 & n.4 (N.D. 11. 1990); Abernathy v. United States (In re Abernathy),
150 B.R. 688, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
165. Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1514 (5th Cir. 1990).
166. McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 155 B.R. 294, 296 n.1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
167. See, e.g., In re Depew, 51 B.R. 1010, 1012 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (district court may
refer its inherent contempt power to bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157); cf. United States
v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1992) (order of bankruptcy court is considered order of a
"unit" of the district court; district court has authority to punish for contempt of "its" order).
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made clear, "adjuncts" to Article III courts may operate within consti-
tutional bounds.
The Supreme Court's decisions dealing with Article III adjuncts
indicate that one must examine three elements to determine whether
a delegation of powers by an Article III court to an "adjunct" is per-
missible. First, does clear statutory authorization for (or prohibition
of) the delegation exist? If the statute precludes the delegation, the
analysis ends. If the statute clearly authorizes the delegation or is sus-
ceptible of either interpretation, has the adjunct inappropriately as-
sumed the functions of an Article III court? Finally, if a constitutional
issue otherwise would loom as a result of the delegation, have the af-
fected parties waived their right to adjudication by an Article III court
by consenting or failing timely to object to the delegation? Increas-
ingly, the presence of consent has been critical to any constitutional
analysis of delegation of Article III power to non-Article III adjuncts.
1. Statutory Authorization
Judicial analysis inevitably begins with statutory interpretation.
Although the courts' analysis of the specific language of other statutes
is not particularly relevant to interpretation of the Code, the precepts
applied by courts in their statutory interpretation have general appli-
cability. The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that "[iut is
our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that
engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpreta-
tion poses no constitutional question.' 1 68  Moreover, a court should
interpret the statute in "the context of the overall statutory
scheme."'1 69  As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen a statute
creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline
the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant
to a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some
relation to the specified duties."' 70
Applying these general principles, courts have found statutory
authority for the delegation of various powers to magistrate judge ad-
juncts and others.171 Where courts have found legislative authoriza-
168. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (citing Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)); accord Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929
(1991); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932).
169. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864; see also McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991) (quot-
ing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of
[a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the lan-
guage and design of the statute as a whole.")); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158
(1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.").
170. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864.
171. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) (consensual jury selection in fel-
ony trial); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991) (trial on claim challenging allegedly uncon-
stitutional prison conduct); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (suppression hearing);
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tion to be lacking, the basis for such a decision has been either clear
statutory language to the contrary'72 or the policy of constitutional
avoidance described above. 73
Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended § 157 to
allow a bankruptcy judge to conduct jury trials if so authorized by the
district court and with the express consent of all parties,17 courts
hotly debated the statutory power of a bankruptcy judge to preside
over a jury trial in a core proceeding. Five courts of appeals found no
legislative provision permitting the exercise of such power and, to
avoid creating a constitutional issue, declined to find implied power
under § 157 or otherwise. 175 Only one found statutory (and constitu-
tional) authorization. 76 However, the prevailing approach with re-
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (review of administrative determination regarding Social
Security benefits); Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.) (hearing on allegedly unconstitu-
tional police conduct), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992); United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120
(4th Cir. 1991) (presiding over return of jury verdict), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 983 (1992); United
States v. Martinez-Torres, 944 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1991) (empaneling jury in felony case); Virgin
Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989) (supervising voir dire in felony case), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 949 (1990); cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(upholding jurisdiction of CFTC over common-law counterclaims to reparations claims).
172. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (habeas corpus hearings); In re Elcona
Homes Corp., 810 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1987) (appeals of bankruptcy court decisions).
173. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (nonconsensual jury selection in fel-
ony trial); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972) (motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment).
174. Section 112 of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended the Code to read:
(e) If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section by
a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if specially designated
to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the
parties.
28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1995).
175. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Schwartzman (In re Stansbury Pop-
lar Place, Inc.), 13 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992);
Rafoth v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169 (6th
Cir. 1992); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990);
In re United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Stein v.
Miller, 158 B.R. 876 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A. (In re Billing),
150 B.R. 563 (D.N.J. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 22 F.3d 1242 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct.
508 (1994); Taxel v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc. (In re Palomar Elec. Supply, Inc.), 138
B.R. 959 (S.D. Cal. 1992); Growers Packing Co. v. Community Bank of Homestead, 134 B.R.
438 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Torcise v. Community Bank of Homestead, 131 B.R. 503 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Transcon Lines), 121 B.R. 837 (C.D. Cal. 1990); In re Fort
Lauderdale Hotel Partners, Ltd., 103 B.R. 335 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Terry v. Proehl (In re Proehl), 36
B.R. 86 (W.D. Va. 1984); In re Johnson, 115 B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1990).
176. See Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394
(2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991); see also R.H. Smith v. Lynco-Electric Co. (In re El Paso Refin-
ery, L.P.), 165 B.R. 826 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Walsh v. California Commerce Bank (In re Interbank
Mortgage Corp.), 128 B.R. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Leonard v. Wessel (In re Jackson), 118 B.R. 243
(E.D. Pa. 1990); Dailey v. First Peoples Bank of NJ., 76 B.R. 963 (D.N.J. 1987); McCormick v.
American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick), 67 B.R. 838 (D. Nev. 1986); In re
Branded Prods., Inc., 154 B.R. 936 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Bingham Sys., Inc., 139 B.R.
809 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991); In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); In re Price-
Watson Co., 66 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); cf. Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A.
(In re Billing), 22 F.3d 1242 (3d Cir.) (debtors did not have right to jury trial; not reaching issue
of power of bankruptcy court to conduct jury trial), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 508 (1994).
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spect to contempt power-for which no explicit statutory authority
exists and for which the analysis therefore should have been identical
prior to the 1994 amendment-has differed dramatically, even when
considered by the same court that found jury trials so problematic.
As discussed in section IV.A, those courts finding contempt
power in the bankruptcy courts conclude that Congress has statutorily
granted the power in § 105(a) and § 157.1'7 While such an interpreta-
tion undoubtedly furthers the general statutory scheme of bankruptcy
jurisdiction, it undermines the policy of avoiding constitutional issues
where possible.
Since the amendments effected by BAFJA, the Code itself no
longer contains any language relating to the contempt power. The
very absence of such language might be viewed as significant. For ex-
ample, the Federal Magistrates Act,1 78 which provides for the appoint-
ment and jurisdiction of magistrate judges, explicitly denies magistrate
judges the power to cite a party for contempt occurring in proceedings
before them. Pursuant to § 636(e) of Title 28 of the United States
Code,'7 9 if any act or conduct constituting contempt occurs before a
magistrate judge, the magistrate judge must "certify the facts to a
judge of the district court" and may issue an order to show cause re-
quiring the alleged contemnor to appear before the district court for a
contempt hearing. Only the district court may hear the evidence and
punish the contempt.8 The language of § 636(e) is nearly identical to
177. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
178. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-
639, 1915 (1988), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401-3402 (1994)).
179. That section provides in full:
In a proceeding before a magistrate, any of the following acts or conduct shall constitute a
contempt of the district court for the district wherein the magistrate is sitting: (1) disobedi-
ence or resistance to any lawful order, process, or writ; (2) misbehavior at a hearing or other
proceeding, or so near the place thereof as to obstruct the same; (3) failure to produce, after
having been ordered to do so, any pertinent document; (4) refusal to appear after having
been subpoenaed or, upon appearing, refusal to take the oath or affirmation as a witness, or,
having taken the oath or affirmation, refusal to be examined according to law; or (5) any
other act or conduct which if committed before a judge of the district court would constitute
contempt of such court. Upon the commission of any such act or conduct, the magistrate
shall forthwith certify the facts to a judge of the district court and may serve or cause to be
served upon any person whose behavior is brought into question under this section an order
requiring such person to appear before a judge of that court upon a day certain to show
cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts so certified. A
judge of the district court shall thereupon, in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to the
act or conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, punish such person
in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed before a judge of
the court, or commit such person upon the conditions applicable in the case of defiance of
the process of the district court or misconduct in the presence of a judge of that court.
28 U.S.C. § 636(e).
180. See, e.g., Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 901-08 (3d Cir. 1992)
(reversing contempt judgment entered by district court because magistrate judge held contempt
trial and district court relied on record of that trial instead of holding de novo hearing); see also
United States v. Ritte, 558 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir. 1977) (magistrate had no jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate contempt); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 93-C-0609, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6245, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1994) (district court must conduct de novo hearing, not merely
make de novo determination as under § 636(b)(1)(C)); cf Stotts v. Quinlan, 139 F.R.D. 321, 324
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that of former section 41, which specified procedures for contempt
occurring before bankruptcy referees. 18 1
Some have suggested that Congress looked to the Federal Magis-
trates Act and the pre-Code bankruptcy referee system in crafting its
response to Marathon in the BAFJA amendments, at least with re-
spect to its noncore jurisdiction."8 If that is so, the absence in the
amended Code of provisions comparable to those set forth in sections
636(e) and 41 can be interpreted to support or negate the argument
that Congress intended to confer contempt powers on the bankruptcy
judges. On the one hand, those precedents demonstrate that Con-
gress knew well how to deal with the contempt power when it in-
tended to deny it to Article III adjuncts. Its failure to include a similar
provision in the Code, especially in light of the inclusion of a limita-
tion on the contempt power in the Emergency Rule, 83 could indicate
that Congress intended no limitation on the contempt power. On the
other hand, Congress expressly repealed those sections of the 1978
version of the Code that it viewed as the jurisdictional basis for the
exercise of the contempt power. Thus, the absence of any provision
like section 636(e) simply may reflect the obvious conclusion that a
limitation on a power is not necessary unless the power is granted.
If the absence of language specifically dealing with contempt does
not inform the controversy, does the language included in the Code
implicitly authorize the exercise of the contempt power by bankruptcy
judges? Searching for such authorization in § 105(a), as many courts
have done, is fruitless for several reasons. First, as the language of
§ 105(c) makes clear, the extent to which bankruptcy judges (as op-
posed to the district court) can exercise the powers referred to in
§ 105(a) "shall be determined by reference to the provisions relating
to such judge... set forth in title 28. '1184 In other words, § 105(a) does
not itself grant any jurisdiction on the bankruptcy judges; it merely
enables them to perform certain functions within their Title 28-con-
ferred jurisdiction.
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (declining to certify facts to district court); In re Kitterman, 696 F. Supp. 1366,
1370 (D. Nev. 1988) (although magistrate may not hold contempt hearing, magistrate may hold
hearing on whether certification to district court should occur). But cf. Proctor v. North Caro-
lina, 830 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (any party must be allowed to introduce evidence before
district court hearing contempt proceeding); Miami Valley Carpenters Dist. Council Pension
Fund v. Scheckelhoff, 123 F.R.D. 263, 267-69 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (magistrate concludes that he can
exercise contempt power under § 636(c) with respect to all civil matters as to which parties have
consented to magistrate's jurisdiction despite § 636(e)).
181. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The Senate Report discussing § 636 at the
time of its enactment noted that the definition of contempt was the same as under the 1898 Act.
See S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967).
182. See, e.g., Production Steel, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In re Production Steel, Inc.),
48 B.R. 841, 844 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
183. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
184. 11 U.S.C. § 105(c) (1994); see, e.g., Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.),
827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Sea Span Publications, Inc., 126 B.R. 622, 625 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991).
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Second, the history of § 105(a) indicates that it never intended to
confer contempt power on anyone. The original language of § 105(a)
was based on section 2(15) of the 1898 Act.185 However, the 1898 Act
also included specific authorization to the courts of bankruptcy both
to "enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all
lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment,"'1 86
and to "punish persons for contempts committed before referees."'187
Congress could not have intended that section 2(15), later trans-
formed into § 105(a), cover the same subject as these other more spe-
cific sections.
Moreover, the 1978 Code also had more specific sections confer-
ring jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts, including § 1481, which specifi-
cally dealt with contempt power.188  If § 105(a) was intended to
convey contempt power, Congress would have included the exclusion
for punishment of criminal contempts not committed in the presence
of the judge or warranting imprisonment in both § 105(a) and § 1481.
The addition of the second sentence to § 105(a) in 1986 does not
change this analysis.'89  Nothing in the language of the amendment
itself or in the legislative history indicates an intention to confer con-
tempt power on the bankruptcy judges. Indeed, the amendment's in-
clusion in a portion of the law dealing with United States trustees and
their activities suggests that Congress intended to negate the implica-
tion that the divestiture of administrative functions from bankruptcy
judges to trustees barred bankruptcy judges from sua sponte taking
actions that the new trustees now would more likely propose.19° The
relationship between the amendment and the United States trustee
system is confirmed by the provisions dealing with the effective date
of the amendment, which made the amendment effective for particu-
185. Section 2(15) of the 1898 Act, previously codified at 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15), authorized
courts of bankruptcy to "make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provi-
sions of this Act." Section 105(a) authorized bankruptcy courts to "issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
186. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2(13), 30 Stat. 544, 546 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
187. Id. § 2(16), 30 Stat. at 546.
188. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. See generally William S. Parkinson, The
Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court Fact or Fiction: The Debate Continues, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 591, 613-19 (1991) (arguing that § 105(a) cannot provide legislative authority for contempt
power).
190. The controversy over whether a bankruptcy judge could take action without a motion
by a party had been a contentious issue prior to the amendment. Compare In re Moog, 774 F.2d
1073 (11th Cir. 1985) and Gusam Restaurant Corp. v. Speciner (In re Gusam Restaurant Corp.),
737 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984) (court could not sua sponte convert case to Chapter 7 under 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b)) with Hayes v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, No. 87-2171, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3329, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 1992) and In re Bayou Self, Inc., 73 B.R. 682, 683
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1987) (bankruptcy court could dismiss sua sponte a Chapter 11 case even
before amendment to § 105(a)).
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lar districts only as those districts became part of the permanent
United States Trustee system.191
Rule 9020, often cited by courts as additional legislative support
for the contempt power,19 cannot provide statutory authorization.
Bankruptcy rules are promulgated under the aegis of the Rules En-
abling Act,'193 which explicitly provides that the rules may not
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." If Rule 9020 were
intended to create contempt power in the bankruptcy courts without
substantive statutory authorization, it would itself be invalid.
If § 105(a) and Rule 9020 cannot serve as statutory authorization
of the contempt power, can § 157(a) provide the basis for such a
grant? Section 157(a) authorizes district courts to refer "any or ali
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11" to the bankruptcy judges, and it gives bankruptcy
judges the authority to "hear and determine" core proceedings and
"hear" noncore proceedings. 194
As an initial point, all matters over which bankruptcy judges have
jurisdiction are either core or noncore matters. If they are core, the
bankruptcy judge is authorized to issue a final order which is then
subject to appeal "in the same manner as appeals in court proceedings
generally.' 1 95 If they are noncore, the bankruptcy judge has authority
only to "submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court, and any final order or judgement shall be entered by the
district court" after a de novo review of matters to which any party
has objected.196 Section 157 does not authorize a bankruptcy judge to
enter an order in a noncore matter which becomes final if no objec-
tion is filed; if civil contempt proceedings are noncore, the provisions
of Rule 9020 violate the requirements of § 157.197
191. But see In re Daily Corp., 72 B.R. 489, 493-95 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that
Congress made a technical error in linking the effective date of the § 105(a) amendment to the
trustee program, and finding that § 105(a) amendment was intended to overrule court decisions
concluding that a bankruptcy court was not a party in interest and, thus, could not act sua
sponte). The provisions relating to the effective date were later amended to make the amend-
ment to § 105 effective for those districts without trustee systems. See supra note 87 and accom-
panying text.
192. See supra note 104.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988); see also supra note 21.
194. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c).
196. Id. § 157(c)(1).
197. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. If contempt proceedings are core, Rule
9020 also fails to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) because it does not permit a bankruptcy
judge to enter a final order subject to normal appellate review. However, by affording parties
more scrutiny by an Article III judge than they would otherwise obtain, Rule 9020 would not
have any constitutional infirmity if contempt proceedings were core. Cf. Monarch Life Ins. Co.
v. Ropes & Gray (In re Monarch Capital Corp.), 173 B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (finding
Rule 9020 inapplicable to "core" contempt proceedings), aff'd, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995).
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"Core proceedings" are defined in § 157(b)(2). 198 None of the
specifically itemized subjects in clauses (B)-(N) is applicable to con-
tempt. The issue is whether contempt proceedings can be character-
ized as "matters concerning the administration of the estate" 199 or
"other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship. ' '2°  These "catch-all" clauses have been a source of con-
troversy for courts since their enactment. Some courts have taken the
view that they should be read narrowly and that no claim that is not
enumerated elsewhere in § 157(b)(2) should be included within the
"catch-all" provisions; these courts fear that to hold otherwise might
exceed the constitutional limits on bankruptcy court jurisdiction estab-
lished by Marathon.2 1 Other courts believe that the grant of jurisdic-
tion established by § 157 should be read broadly and that the "catch-
all" provisions encompass everything, except those state law claims
specifically excluded from bankruptcy court jurisdiction in Mara-
thon.2° Still other courts adopt a functional approach, looking to
whether the claim invokes a substantive right created by bankruptcy
law and whether it is one which exists independent of bankruptcy law
and the bankruptcy case.2 °3
If the first approach is adopted, the question regarding the con-
tempt power is answered; the claim must be considered noncore, and
bankruptcy courts have no statutory authority to enter final orders.
The functional approach should lead to the same conclusion.
Although a charge of contempt is neither a preexisting claim nor a
198. See supra note 68.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
200. Id. § 157(b)(2)(O).
201. See, e.g., Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d
159, 162 (9th Cir. 1986); Garland & Lachance Constr. Co. v. City of Keene (In re Garland &
Lachance Constr. Co.), BK No. 89-11258. 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2123, at *15 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb.
22, 1991); United Security & Communications, Inc. v. Rite Aid Corp. (In re United Security &
Communications, Inc.), 93 B.R. 945, 956-58 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); United States v. Richard-
son (In re Richardson), 85 B.R. 1008, 1022 n.29 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); Acolyte Elec. Corp. v.
City of N.Y., 69 B.R. 155, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, No. 86-0329, 1987 WL 47763
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1987).
202. See, e.g., Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.),
4 F.3d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1418 (1994); Ben Cooper, Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1398 (2d Cir.), vacated and re-
manded, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
928 (1991); Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988); Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d
165, 168 (1st Cir. 1987); Lesser v. A-Z Assocs. (In re Lion Capital Group), 46 B.R. 850, 859
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 63 B.R. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
203. See, e.g., Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 617 (9th Cir.
1993); Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 483 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 267 (3d Cir.
1991); Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1450 n.5
(9th Cir. 1990); Gardner v. United States (In re Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990);
Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); Hoffman v. Ramirez (In re As-
troline Communications Co.), 161 B.R. 874, 878 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993).
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claim based on state law, it exists completely independent of the bank-
ruptcy case. The claim involves noncompliance with the exercise of
judicial power. The fact that the power allegedly flouted is that of a
bankruptcy judge does not change the nature of the offense any more
than the murder of a bankruptcy judge would make the perpetrator
subject to core jurisdiction.
If the expansive approach is correct, the question regarding the
contempt power simply is refrained as follows: If Congress intended§ 157(a) to confer on bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over all proceed-
ings within its constitutional power, is the contempt power within the
exclusive purview of an Article III court, or can Congress constitu-
tionally delegate it to an adjunct? Because this formulation of the
question makes the statutory interpretation issue coextensive with the
constitutional analysis (thus violating the general principle of inter-
preting statutes to avoid constitutional issues where possible), it
moves us to the next step: the respective functions of an Article III
court and an adjunct to that court.
2. Functions of Adjunct and Article III Courts
If statutory authorization is clear or ambiguous, the courts have
examined the respective functions of the adjunct and the delegating
Article III judge to determine if each continues to play a constitu-
tional role in adjudication. Two concepts appear to be touchstones in
this analysis. First, are the involved claims the type adjudication of
which Congress may delegate to a non-Article III body?2" Second, if
not, have the "essential attributes of the judicial power ' 20 5 been re-
tained by the Article III court, including the ultimate decision-making
authority? 20 6
a. Public Rights Doctrine
In declaring the bankruptcy courts as established by the 1978 ver-
sion of the Code unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Marathon
found inapplicable those cases upholding, against constitutional chal-
lenge, "legislative courts and administrative agencies" created to adju-
dicate matters involving "public rights. ' 207 The plurality concluded
that causes of action involving liability of one individual to another,
204. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) (stating that if a statutory
cause of action "is not a 'public right' for Article III purposes, then Congress may not assign its
adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court lacking 'the essential attributes of the judicial
power' ").
205. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
206. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,53 (1989); Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81, 84-85 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-83 (1980);
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976).
207. 458 U.S. at 67-72. The "public rights" doctrine was first described in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), as follows:
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such as those at issue in the state law claims entrusted by the 1978
Code to bankruptcy courts, are matters of "private rights" which "lie
at the core of the historically recognized judicial power." Thus, Con-
gress cannot delegate their resolution to legislative courts or adminis-
trative agencies.208
However, the plurality opinion did not foreclose the argument
that the "public rights" doctrine might justify certain aspects of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. In an oft-quoted aside, Justice Brennan wrote:
But the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the
core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from
the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right
to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case. The for-
mer may well be a "public right," but the latter obviously is
not.
209
Although the concurring opinion in Marathon did not endorse
the plurality's "public rights" analysis210 and the Supreme Court sub-
sequently seemed to back away from the doctrine,21' the "public
rights" doctrine has been revived in the bankruptcy field by the Sev-
enth Amendment. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,212 the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, may provide for resolution of claims without a jury trial,
even if the claims are of the sort tried by courts of law in eighteenth-
century England and even if the claimants seek a remedy that is legal
in nature, if the claims constitute "public rights." The Court added
that the analyses of the public rights doctrine under Article III and
under the Seventh Amendment are coextensive.213
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that-the
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determina-
tion, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the
United States, as it may deem proper.
Id. at 284.
208. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 70.
209. Id. at 71.
210. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
211. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) ("this
Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for Article III purposes the distinction
between public rights and private rights"); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 585-86 (1985) ("This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy... provides a
bright-line test for determining the requirements of Article III did not command a majority of
the Court in Northern Pipeline.").
212. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
213. Id. at 53-54. The Supreme Court relied on cases that clearly involved administrative
agencies rather than Article III adjuncts. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (administrative agency administering OSHA);
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (District of Columbia rent control commission); cf. Pernell v.
Southhall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (contrasting District of Columbia local courts with
"administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of
administrative adjudication").
Arguably, the congressional reconstitution of the bankruptcy courts as Article III adjuncts
rather than legislative courts should have made the "public rights" doctrine inapplicable. See 98
CONG. REc. H6046 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984) (remarks of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier) ("It is
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The plurality opinion in Marathon acknowledged that precedent
had not established definitively the boundaries of the public rights
doctrine, but it suggested that the doctrine "extends only to matters
arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of
the executive or legislative departments,'... and only to matters that
historically could have been determined exclusively by those depart-
ments." '214 The plurality further stated that "a matter of public rights
must at a minimum arise 'between the government and others.' "215
The doctrine received a more functional interpretation by the
Supreme Court in later cases. The Court has indicated, for example,
that the public rights doctrine "reflects simply a pragmatic under-
standing that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolv-
ing matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the Executive
and Legislative Branches,' the danger of encroaching on the judicial
powers is reduced. 2 16 The Court rejected the notion that the federal
government's presence or absence as a party of record determines
whether a case involves "public rights" or "private rights." '2 17 Instead,
where the government is not a party, the relevant inquiry is whether
"Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its consti-
tutional powers under Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly 'private'
not important that bankruptcy proceedings do not involve 'public rights.' Jurisdiction must be
confined to public rights only where Congress attempts to create a separate article I court. My
amendment establishes bankruptcy judges as adjuncts to the district court."). However, Con-
gress apparently sought to rely on these Article I cases to justify the powers conferred on bank-
ruptcy judges within their "core" jurisdiction. See In re Production Steel, Inc., 48 B.R. 841, 846
(M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("In this Court's view, Congress has created a system of bankruptcy courts
with two distinguishable bases of authority. First, each court is a 'legislative court' with the
authority to make final judgments on matters that are at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power. Second, each court is also an adjunct to the district court in matters that are merely
related to bankruptcy proceedings."); In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551, 563-64 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1991) ("In drafting the 1984 Amendments, Congress, however, apparently adopted a 'belt and
suspenders' approach; i.e., in addition to fashioning a grant of judicial power that would fall
within the adjunct exception, it also attempted to place a majority of the disputes commonly
heard by bankruptcy judges within the 'public rights' doctrine.").
214. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) and Ex
parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)).
215. Id. at 69. The plurality also stated that "the presence of the United States as a proper
party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights'
from 'public rights'." Id. at 69 n.23. The doctrine was described in similar terms by the Court in
Atlas Roofing Co., where the Court provided as an example of cases involving "public rights"
those "in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by
statutes within the power of Congress to enact." Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 450.
216. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (quoting North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)); accord Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1986) (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at
589).
217. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586, 598-99 (Brennan, J., concurring); Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at
54. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately in Granfinanciera to express his
view that the plurality opinion in Marathon correctly defined the public rights doctrine and that
matters involving such rights must arise "between the government and others." 492 U.S. at 65
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marathon, 458 U.S. at 69).
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right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to
be a matter appropriate for agency resolution." '218
The applicability of the "public rights" doctrine to bankruptcy ju-
risdiction is not self-evident. The Marathon plurality's suggestion that
the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations may be a "public
right" '219 has been soundly criticized,220 and the majority opinion in
Granfinanciera disclaimed it.221 Granfinanciera, which involved a
fraudulent conveyance claim, made clear that the characterization of a
claim as a "core proceeding" under the Code does not determine
whether such claim is a "public right."222 Furthermore, cases subse-
quent to Granfinanciera have read the "public rights" doctrine nar-
rowly in the Seventh Amendment context.223
218. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94); see also Simpson
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir: 1994) (holding that the Office of
Thrift Supervision serves a "public purpose" of the sort that Congress envisioned in providing
for administrative adjudication), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1096 (1995).
219. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71.
220. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16
CREIGrON L. REV. 441, 452 (1983); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying
the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MIN'N. L. REV. 967, 1040-41 n.347
(1988); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint
Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 537 n.8 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that "certain aspects of the administra-
tion of a bankruptcy estate do not conform easily to the Northern Pipeline plurality's definition
of public rights"); Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that
"the rights determined in connection with a discharge in bankruptcy do not fit easily with the
Northern Pipeline plurality's definition of the public rights doctrine"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006
(1988).
221. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 n.11 ("We do not suggest that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right. This thesis has met with substantial scholarly
criticism .... and we need not and do not seek to defend it here.") (citations omitted). This
footnote produced special criticism from Justice White in dissent, suggesting that the views of
legal scholars should not be the basis for rejecting "otherwise viable strains in our case law." Id.
at 90 n.13 (White, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 61; see also Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating that the mere designation of a proceeding as "core" does not control whether an
action may be tried before a jury).
223. See, e.g., Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d at 1331-32 (suit by trustee for
tortious interference, coercion, duress, breach of duty of good faith, unfair business practices,
and misrepresentation involved private rights); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 441 (3d Cir.
1990) (action by trustee to recover rents for use of properties and to declare option to buy
building invalid found to be matter of private right); Bernheim v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Can., 160
B.R. 42, 45 (D.N.J. 1993) (claim on insurance policy by trustee held matter of private right);
Stein v. Miller, 158 B.R. 876, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (claims by trustee to recover preferential and
fraudulent transfers held "legal" causes of action, matters of private right); System Freight, Inc.
v. Midas Int'l Corp. (In re System Freight, Inc.), No. 90-4908, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2674, at *11
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 1991) (claims by bankruptcy corporation for undercharges based on pre-petition
contract held to be private right); Growers Packing Co. v. Community Bank of Homestead, 134
B.R. 438, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (action to recover preference held a private right); Allied Stores
Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co. (In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.), 144 B.R. 993, 997 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1992) (adversary proceeding involving coverage dispute under fiduciary liability policy a
held private right); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A. (In re Kroh
Bros. Dev. Co.), 108 B.R. 710, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (claims seeking money judgments
for alleged pre-petition set-offs and preferential transfers held private rights); Wilkey v. Inter-
Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989) (trustee's
action against general partners under § 723 of Code is not a public right); Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.
v. Air Enters., Inc. (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 B.R. 552, 564 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)
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Can bankruptcy court jurisdiction over contempt proceedings be
justified as an adjudication of "public rights"? Those cases that have
answered this question in the affirmative, either explicitly2 4 or by dis-
tinguishing contempt proceedings from the state-created "private
rights" involved in Marathon,225 have reached that conclusion without
the benefit of the Court's analysis in Granfinanciera.226 Indeed, most
courts which have found civil contempt within the constitutional
power of the bankruptcy court have so concluded simply on the basis
that they deemed the matter "core," '227 although the Court now has
made clear that Congress cannot affect a constitutional right "merely
by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing ex-
clusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized court
of equity."22 8
Application of the most recent Supreme Court formulation of the
"public rights" doctrine must lead to the conclusion that a contempt
proceeding falls outside its parameters, despite the fact that contempt
does not involve a Marathon-like state-created cause of action. Civil
contempt certainly does not "arise 'between the government and
others,'" the exclusive characterization of the doctrine endorsed by
the plurality in Marathon229 and by Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Granfinanciera.23° Civil contempt is initiated by a private party, and
the remedy is compensation to that party.23'
(claims arising out of labor and materials provided by subcontractor to bankruptcy held private
rights); Haden v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 104 B.R. 890, 895 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (adver-
sary proceedings against third party for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract
and negligence jointly with debtor involved private rights). But see In re Windmill Farms Man-
agement Co., 116 B.R. 755, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) (dispute over lease is part of "closely-
integrated scheme for resolving lease disputes" embodied in § 365 of Code, and no jury trial
right attaches).
224. See Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 951 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
225. See Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 670 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Schatz, 122
B.R. 327, 329-30 (N.D. I11. 1990) (decided post-Granfinanciera, but not citing it); Kellogg v.
Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 38 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Better Homes of Va., Inc. v. Budget Serv. Co. (In re
Better Homes of Va., Inc.), 52 B.R. 426, 431 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1986).
226. The only case to analyze the contempt power of a bankruptcy court under the "public
rights" doctrine as elucidated in Granfinanciera did so in the context of criminal, not civil, con-
tempt and noted that "to the extent that the constitutional boundary of bankruptcy court juris-
diction is dependent upon the public rights doctrine, which it appears to be .... that doctrine has
never encompassed criminal matters." Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1510-11
(5th Cir. 1990) (footnote and citations omitted).
227. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
228. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1989).
229. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
230. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text. Civil contempt in a bankruptcy court
case, thus, is distinguishable from contempt proceedings in the Tax Court, where the government
is always a party to the action. The Tax Court, an Article I court, has the power to punish
contempt of its authority pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) as an exercise
of "judicial power," but not Article III judicial power. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
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Because the government is not a party to the action, the func-
tional inquiry endorsed by the Supreme Court2 32 would look to
whether Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its
Article I powers, has created a cause of action for civil contempt that,
while not "between the government and others," is "so closely inte-
grated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate
for [non-Article III] resolution. 2 33 This definition of the public rights
doctrine fails to encompass a civil contempt proceeding for three rea-
sons. First, Congress has not created the cause of action for civil con-
tempt. It exists in an Article III court by virtue of inherent power, 3
and Congress has not explicitly conferred it on bankruptcy judges.235
Second, the Code does not represent a "public regulatory scheme" in
the same sense as "the exercise of the congressional power as to inter-
state and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands,
public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments
to veterans. '236 Rather, the regulation of debtor-creditor relations
"alters and often abrogates pre-existing, legally cognizable property
rights" of creditors,237 rights that have never been exclusively vested
in the legislative or executive branches of government. Finally, civil
contempt is not so "closely integrated" a part of the Code as to neces-
sitate its resolution by the bankruptcy court. Indeed, as mentioned
above, contempt is not part of the statutory provisions of the Code at
all. Even were it included as a legislative matter, the determination of
contempt motions easily could be allotted to the Article III district
courts without doing violence to any other provision of the statutory
scheme, as the Federal Magistrate Act has demonstrated.238 This
analysis leads to the conclusion that contempt proceedings do not in-
volve matters of "public rights." If Congress constitutionally may con-
fer jurisdiction over such actions on bankruptcy judges, it must be
justified on other grounds.
b. Essential Attributes of Judicial Power
The second factor considered by courts analyzing the constitu-
tionality of the exercise of power by an adjunct is whether the "essen-
tial attributes of the judicial power '239 have been retained by the
868, 889, 891 (1991); see also Bums, Stix, Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 395-96
(1971).
232. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
233. Granfinanceria, 492 U.S. at 54.
234. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
236. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.22 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
237. Duck v. Munn (In re Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988).
238. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
239. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
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Article III court," ° including in particular control over the adjunct
and ultimate decision-making authority. 4' Discerning the "essential
attributes of judicial power" is no simple task. The term is probably
not susceptible of exhaustive definition, other than by the unhelpful
suggestion that it describes those functions which an Article III court
constitutionally cannot delegate. However, an examination of the
functions of those adjuncts whose roles the Supreme Court has upheld
or struck down reveals certain common threads.
The Supreme Court's analysis of adjuncts under Article III can be
broken down into five categories: subject matter jurisdiction, role of
adjunct, power to enforce orders, power to conduct jury trials, and
standard of review. A comparison of these categories can perhaps
best be appreciated by viewing them in tabular form.
TABLE 1
SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF ADJUNCTS UNDER
ARTICLE III
Adjunct United States Employees' Compensation Commis-
sion
2 4 2
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Compensation for injury upon navigable waters of
U.S. if workers' compensation not available
under state law.
243
Role of Adjunct Determininall questions of fact and law in respect
of claim.
Power to Enforce Orders and No. Commissioners cannot punish for contempt or
Punish for Contempts enforce compensation orders.245
Power to Conduct Jury Trials No. Claims are within admiralty jurisdiction and
there is no right to jury trial.246
Standard of Review Compensation order may be set aside if "not in
accordance with law" upon institution of injunc-
tion proceedings.2 47 Findings of fact (except
"jurisdictional facts") are final if supported by
the evidence.
24 8
(Continued on next page)
240. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989); Marathon, 458 U.S. at 81,
84-85.
241. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-83 (1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 271 (1976).
242. See Crowell, 285 U.S. 22.
243. See id. at 37-38.
244. See id. at 43.
245. See id. at 43, 45.
246. See id. at 45.
247. See id. at 44.
248. See id. at 46.
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TABLE 1-Continued
Adjunct
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Role of Adjunct
Magistrate Judges
249
Jurisdiction same as that of the district court.
Hear and determine most pretrial matters, 250 hear
post-trial aplihcations for relief,25 1 serve as spe-
cial master,- 2 additional duties delegated by
district court,253 and consensual civil trials.
2 5 4
Power to Enforce Orders and Magistrate judge may only certify facts to district
Punish for Contempts court.
2 55
Power to Conduct Jury Trials
Standard of Review
Only with consent of parties, in civil cases,25 6 and
criminal misdemeanor cases.
257
In cases of nonconsensual reference of dispositive
motions, magistrate judge is limited to making
recommendations to district court which conducts
de novo determination on request. 258 For
nondispositive motions, magistrate's order is
reviewed under "clearly erroneous or contrary to
law" standard.2 59 Consensual reference for civil
or misdemeanor trial is subject to usual appellate
review.
2 6 0
(Continued on next page)
249. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136
(1991); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1988).
251. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
252. Id. § 636(b)(2).
253. Id. § 636(b)(3).
254. Id. § 636(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
255. Id. § 636(e) (1988).
256. Id. § 636(c)(1).
257. 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), (b)(1), (b)(1)(C).
259. Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
260. Id. § 636(c)(3)-(6); 18 U.S.C. § 3402.
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TABLE 1-Continued
Adjunct
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Role of Adjunct
Power to Enforce Orders and
Punish for Contempts
Power to Conduct Jury Trials
Standard of Review
Adjunct
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Role of Adjunct
Power to Enforce Orders and
Punish for Contempts
Power to Conduct Jury Trials
Standard of Review
261.
(1982).
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
Pre-BAFJA Bankruptcy Courts2 6 1
All civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under Title 11.262
Exercising all of the jurisdiction conferred byCode. 263
Yes. Could exercise "all ordinary powers of district
courts" including power to issue final, enforce-
able orders, and orders appropriate for enforce-
ment of provisions of Title 11, but could not
enjoin another court or punish criminal con-
tempts not committed in presence of judge or
warranting imprisonment.
Could preside over jury trials.265
Normal appelate review, "clearly erroneous" stan-
7266
Commodities Futures Trading Commission
2 67
Commodity Exchange Act, including administration
of reparations procedure and common law coun-
terclaims.
2 68
Holding a hearing and entering reparations
order.
2 69
No. Order directing payment of reparations could
be enforced only in federal district court.2 7 °
No.
2 7 1
Orders reviewable under "weight of the evidence
standard," with legal determinations subject to
de novo review.
2 7Z
(Continued on next page)
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-87
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 (1978) (repealed 1984).
Id. (repealed 1984).
See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 85 & n.37.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2671 (1978) (repealed 1984).
See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 55 n.5.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
See id. at 836.
See id.
Id. at 836, 853.
See id. at 853.
See id.
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TABLE 1-Continued
Adjunct Arbitrators Under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)273
Subject Matter Jurisdiction FIFRA compensation disputes regarding use of
data submitted to support pesticide registra-
tions.
2 7 4
Role of Adjunct Binding arbitration over compensation disputes.275
Power to Enforce Orders and No. Can impose sanctions of canceling new regis-
Punish for Contempts tration or denying compensation. Not clear
whether judicial enforcement could be sought.2 76
Power to Conduct Jury Trials No.
Standard of Review Subject to review for "fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct."
27 7
One might draw the following conclusions from this tabular sum-
mary: (1) the broader the subject matter jurisdiction conferred on the
adjunct (especially if that jurisdiction includes rights that Congress did
not create), the less likely that the delegation will be upheld; (2) the
more the adjunct performs tasks that are traditionally undertaken by
Article III judges (as opposed to limited fact-finding), the more sus-
pect the delegation; (3) an adjunct that is not an Article I court but
has the power to enforce its own orders (other than through adminis-
trative sanctions) has not yet been held constitutional;278 (4) an ad-
junct that can conduct a jury trial without the consent of the parties
has not yet been found constitutional; and (5) the less deferential the
review afforded to adjunct determinations, the more likely the ad-
junct's role will be upheld.
Whether the "essential attributes of judicial power" must be ex-
amined as a package or on an item-by-item basis is unclear. Are cer-
tain attributes (such as the power to enforce orders and punish for
contempt or the power to conduct a jury trial) so intrinsically judicial
in nature that any effort to confer them on non-Article III entities,
absent the consent of the parties, must fail constitutional challenge,
even if the Article III court retains other attributes of judicial power?
The Supreme Court's Marathon opinion, the only Supreme Court
opinion to reach the Article III issue in the bankruptcy context, pro-
vides little guidance. In Marathon, the Court contrasted the pre-
BAFJA Code with the administrative scheme upheld in Crowell, stat-
ing that the Code "vests all 'essential attributes' of the judicial power
273. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
274. See id. at 572-73.
275. See id. at 573.
276. See id. at 574-75, 591.
277. See id. at 573-74.
278. The Tax Court, an Article I court, was specifically granted the power of contempt in 26
U.S.C. § 7456(c). See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).
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of the United States in the 'adjunct' bankruptcy court. ' 2 7 9 The Court
continued:
First, the agency in Crowell made only specialized, narrowly con-
fined factual determinations regarding a particularized area of
law. In contrast, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts encompasses not only traditional matters of bankruptcy,
but also "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11." ... Second, while the agency in
Crowell engaged in statutorily channeled factfinding functions,
the bankruptcy courts exercise "all of the jurisdiction" conferred
by the Act on the district courts ... . Third, the agency in Crowell
possessed only a limited power to issue compensation orders pur-
suant to specialized procedures, and its orders could be enforced
only by order of the district court. By contrast, the bankruptcy
courts exercise all ordinary powers of district courts, including the
power to preside over jury trials .... the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus,. . . and the power to issue any order, process, or
judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of
Title 11 .... Fourth, while orders issued by the agency in Crowell
were to be set aside if "not supported by the evidence," the judg-
ments of the bankruptcy courts are apparently subject to review
only under the more deferential "clearly erroneous" standard....
Finally, the agency in Crowell was required by law to seek en-
forcement of its compensation orders in the district court. In con-
trast, the bankruptcy courts issue final judgments, which are
binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal. In
short, the "adjunct" bankruptcy courts created by the Act exer-
cise jurisdiction behind the facade of a grant to the district courts,
and are exercising powers far greater than those lodged in the
adjuncts approved in either Crowell or Raddatz.2 0
Judicial interpretation of this language has occurred primarily in
analyzing the power of a bankruptcy court to hold jury trials in core
proceedings.281 Although most courts that have found no such au-
thority have done so on statutory grounds,' those that have reached
the constitutional issue read the language of Marathon with respect to
279. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 84-85.
280. Id. at 85-86 (citations omitted).
281. Courts are in general agreement that a nonconsensual jury trial in a noncore bank-
ruptcy proceeding would be unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Orion
Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1418 (1994); Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinema-
tronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1990); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1990); and
cases cited supra note 175. See generally Gibson, supra note 220, at 1043-48.
282. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Schwartzman (In re Stansbury Pop-
lar Place, Inc.), 13 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992);
Rafoth v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Serv., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169 (6th
Cir. 1992); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990);
In re United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990); Wilkey v. Inter-
Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), 108 B.R. 572 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1989).
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'essential attributes of judicial power" as a definition of the words,
concluding that each of the itemized traits is an "essential attribute"
and cannot be vested in a non-Article III decision maker.28 3 By con-
trast, those courts upholding the authority of bankruptcy courts to
conduct jury trials in core proceedings view the Marathon list of pow-
ers as a package, no one of which is itself inseparable from an Article
III court but which, as a whole, cannot be delegated.2"
These cases all predate the Supreme Court's decision in Freytag v.
Commissioner,285 in which the Court upheld the power of the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court to assign complex cases to a special trial judge
consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.28 6 In
holding that the Tax Court, as an Article I court, constituted a "Court
of Law" within the meaning of Article II of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court concluded that non-Article III tribunals "exercise the
judicial power of the United States,' 287 albeit not the judicial power
defined by Article III of the Constitution. Among those attributes of
judicial power exercised by the Tax Court and noted by the Supreme
Court in Freytag were the authority "to punish contempts by fine or
imprisonment... ; to grant certain injunctive relief... ; to order the
Secretary of the Treasury to refund an overpayment determined by
the court... ; and to subpoena and examine witnesses, order produc-
tion of documents, and administer oaths .... 288
Freytag did not seek to define Article III judicial power, and it
never referred to the "essential attributes" of such power discussed in
283. See, e.g., Gumport v. Growth Fin. Corp. (In re Transcon Lines), 121 B.R. 837, 844 n.7
(C.D. Cal. 1990); Terry v. Proehl (In re Proehl), 36 B.R. 86, 87 (W.D. Va. 1984); Cameron v.
Anderson (In re American Energy, Inc.), 50 B.R. 175, 181 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Hoffman v.
Brown (In re Brown), 56 B.R. 487, 488, 490 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985). See generally Anthony M.
Sabino, Jury Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 258 (1991) (suggesting that the ability to conduct a jury
trial cannot constitutionally be conferred on bankruptcy judges).
284. See, e.g., Stoecker v. Raleigh (In re Stoecker), 117 B.R. 342, 345 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re
Corango Resources, Ltd., No. 89-70527, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19635, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. May
2, 1990); Taxel v. Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 111 B.R. 902, 905 (S.D.
Cal.), rev'd on other grounds, 916 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1990); Citibank, N.A. v. Park-Kenilworth
Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 321, 329 (N.D. II. 1989); Dailey v. First Peoples Bank of N.J., 76 B.R. 963,
967-68 (D.N.J. 1987); McCormick v. American Investors Management, Inc. (In re McCormick),
67 B.R. 838, 840 (D. Nev. 1986); Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus., Inc.), 59
B.R. 402, 406-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City,
N.A. (In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 108 B.R. 710, 715 & n.7 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); cf Ben
Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), vacated
and remanded, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 928 (1991) (upholding power of bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials in core proceedings
without discussion of "essential attributes" concept). See generally Gibson, supra note 220, at
1038-39 (arguing that the Marathon language merely "illustrate[d] the bankruptcy courts' inde-
pendence from district courts").
285. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
286. Article II of the Constitution allows Congress to vest the appointment of inferior of-
ficers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
287. 501 U.S. at 889.
288. Id. at 891.
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Crowell. However, the decision does indicate that the contempt
power is not so inextricably linked to Article III judicial power as to
be incapable of conferral on a non-Article III body. Thus, while con-
tempt may be an essential attribute of judicial power under Article
III, its exercise by an Article I court (or other non-Article III body)
would not necessarily render that body constitutionally flawed. How-
ever, even if the correct approach to the Marathon checklist is to
weigh all factors as a group to ascertain whether too many judicial
attributes have been delegated, the bankruptcy courts remain consti-
tutionally suspect.
Looking at the other categories summarized in Table 1, bank-
ruptcy judges-like United States magistrate judges-exercise broad
subject matter jurisdiction over all proceedings arising in or related to
a bankruptcy case. This contrasts with other adjuncts or agencies
whose jurisdiction is limited to a specialized area of the law. The du-
ties of the bankruptcy judge are more extensive than those of a magis-
trate judge. The bankruptcy judge may "hear and determine" all
"core proceedings" and "hear" all related proceedings, exercising the
same role as an Article III judge except with respect to the finality of
his or her decision in related proceedings. 289 The power of a bank-
ruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial without the consent of the parties
is unsettled,29 ° but of the adjuncts analyzed by the Supreme Court,
only magistrate judges can conduct jury trials, and then only with the
consent of the parties. Finally, the standard of review for bankruptcy
judge determinations is deferential with respect to core matters, but
subject to de novo review in related proceedings, 291 a bifurcated struc-
ture with no precedential parallel. With respect to core proceedings,
"the ultimate decision is made" 29 by the bankruptcy judge, not the
district court.
Even without the contempt power, the bankruptcy courts are
near (if not over) the boundary of permissible constitutional delega-
tion of judicial attributes. Every factor militates in favor of the con-
clusion that the bankruptcy courts have abrogated too many of the
functions and powers of Article III judges to be constitutional ad-
juncts.293 The power of contempt would push the bankruptcy courts
over that constitutional line. Perhaps more than any other judicial
attribute, the contempt power has been singled out by courts as the
determinative factor in distinguishing Article III judges from non-Ar-
289. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (c)(1) (1988).
290. See supra notes 175-76, 281-84 and accompanying text.
291. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(c)(1), 158(c).
292. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980).
293. But see In re Finevest Foods, Inc., 143 B.R. 964, 967 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (stating
th~at the Code as amended by BAFJA "ensur[es] that the 'essential attributes' of judicial power
are retained in the Article III court").
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ticle III adjuncts. As suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc. ,294
[t]he vesting of this [contempt] power exclusively in the hands of
Article III judicial officers would seem, for present purposes at
least, to provide an adequate distinction between such judges and
non-Article III officers. This clear line also serves to limit the
ultimate exercise of judicial power to persons enjoying the consti-
tutional guarantee of independence.295
Thus, while the Supreme Court's decision in Freytag suggests that the
exercise of the contempt power would not be unconstitutional were
the bankruptcy courts Article I courts rather than Article III adjuncts,
the plurality opinion in Marathon seems to foreclose this rationale.
The constitutional infirmity of any attempt to confer civil con-
tempt power on bankruptcy courts is exacerbated by the difficulty in
distinguishing between sanctions for civil contempt and punishment
for criminal contempt, something clearly beyond the power of a bank-
ruptcy court.2 9 6 Commentators have noted that the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is "conceptually unclear and
exceedingly difficult to apply."2" In Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co. ,298 the Supreme Court suggested the following definition:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and pur-
pose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of
cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and
for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal con-
tempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the
court.2 9
294. 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984).
295. Id.; see also Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 117 (2d Cir.) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a statute authorizing magistrates to try civil cases and enter final judgments with the
consent of the parties), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am.,
Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that sufficient protections
exist against the erosion of judicial power to overcome constitutional objections to a magistrate
hearing and entering judgments in civil cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Kalaris v. Dono-
van, 697 F.2d 376, 388 & n.46 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining that the bankruptcy courts at issue in
Northern Pipeline violated Article III of the Constitution because they "exercised all ordinary
power of District Courts"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). But see Gibbons v. Haddad (In re
Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 953-54 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (standard of review for civil contempt is
sufficiently broad to satisfy "essential attributes" test).
296. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
297. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to
the Regulation ofIndirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025,1033 (1993); see also Joseph H. Beale,
Jr., Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1908); Dan B. Dobbs, Con-
tempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REV. 183, 235-49 (1971); Robert J. Martineau, Con-
tempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L.
REV. 677 (1981); Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 780 (1943); Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt of Court, 46 YALE L.J. 326 (1936).
298. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
299. Id. at 441.
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However, "[c]ommon sense would recognize that conduct can amount
to both civil and criminal contempt. The same acts may justify a court
in resorting to coercive and to punitive measures. ' 30 0
Recognizing the "heightened potential for abuse posed by the
contempt power, ' 31 the Supreme Court has afforded those accused of
contempt significant procedural protections.3 2 In its most recent de-
cision, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell,30 3 the Court sug-
gested that, in light of the "somewhat elusive distinction between civil
and criminal contempt fines .... [t]o the extent that such [civil] con-
tempts take on a punitive character ... criminal procedural protec-
tions may be in order. '' 3 4 Although the actual holding in Bagwell was
limited to a finding that the contempt sanctions at issue-character-
ized by the court below as civil in nature-were actually criminal and,
therefore, could not be imposed without a jury trial, the opinion sug-
gests that for contempt proceedings "involving out-of-court disobedi-
ence to complex injunctions," rather than "discrete, readily
ascertainable acts, such as turning over a key or payment of a judg-
ment," civil procedural protections may be insufficient.30 5
A bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to impose criminal
contempt sanctions. Logically, it therefore should be incapable of af-
fording an alleged civil contemnor in cases involving "complex injunc-
tions," such as alleged violations of the automatic stay or the
permanent injunction imposed at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case,
the heightened procedural protections to which the Supreme Court
has said the accused is entitled. In less complex cases, "[c]ourts tradi-
tionally have broad authority through means other than contempt-
such as by striking pleadings, assessing costs, excluding evidence, and
entering default judgment-to penalize a party's failure to comply
with the rules of conduct governing the litigation process."306 For all
of these reasons, the power of contempt, one of the most essential
300. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947) (footnote
omitted).
301. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 (1974); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202
(1968) (noting the potential for "arbitrary and abusive" exercise of the summary power to im-
prison for contempt) (quoting Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888)).
302. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); Codis-
poti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); see also In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that due process rights were violated when the district court ordered the entire
contempt proceeding closed over the objection of grand jury witnesses); In re Gustafson, 650
F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that summary adjudication of contempt against an attorney is
appropriate). See generally Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Judicial Contempt Power, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1990).
303. 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
304. Id. at 2559.
305. Id. at 2560.
306. Id.
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attributes of judicial power, should not, and cannot, be conferred on
bankruptcy judges without the consent of the parties.
3. Jurisdiction by Consent
Even when delegation of authority by an Article III judge to an
adjunct otherwise would violate constitutional constraints, such au-
thority may be exercised when the parties affected explicitly consent
to the jurisdiction of the non-Article III adjunct. Thus, although a
magistrate judge could not otherwise exercise "ultimate adjudicating
or decision making,""3 7 the provisions of § 636(c)(1), °s which author-
ize magistrate judges to conduct trials and enter judgments in civil
matters with the consent of the parties, have been upheld against con-
stitutional challenge. 3° Similarly, courts have upheld the consensual
exercise of Article III powers by magistrate judges under the "catch-
all" statutory authority of § 636(b).31°
307. TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 359 (7th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
308. Section 636(c)(1) provides as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary -
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate ... may
conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of
judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the dis-
trict court or courts he serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988).
309. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1993); Orsini v. Wallace, 913 F.2d 474
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1128 (1991); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516 (11th
Cir. 1987); Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1985); K.M.C. Co., Inc. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Department of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d
1281 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985); Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros.
Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1158 (1985); United States v. $18,505.10, 739 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1984); Puryear v. Ede's
Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 870 (1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984);
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983);
cf. United States v. Bowker, 570 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Or. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of
consensual trial of misdemeanor counts before magistrate), aff'd, 780 F.2d 1028 tbl. (9th Cir.
1985). See generally Magistrate Judges Div. of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A Constitu-
tional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247 (1993).
310. Section 636(b)(3) currently provides as follows: "(3) A magistrate may be assigned
such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). A prior version of § 636(b) authorized district courts to establish
rules pursuant to which such additional duties could be assigned to magistrates. Under both
versions of the statute, consensual references (including those to which the parties made no
objection) have been upheld. See, e.g., Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1014 (1992); United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 983 (1992); United States v. Martinez-Torres, 944 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc); Virgin
Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 949 (1990); Muhich v.
Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979); Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 562 F. Supp. 348 (D. Or. 1983);
cf Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that no local rule permitted a magistrate
to preside over a civil trial); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.
1975) (finding that an order submitting factual disputes to a magistrate for a hearing did not
warrant a conclusion that the parties consented to have the magistrate rule on issues of law),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). But cf In re Elcona Homes Corp., 810 F.2d 136 (7th Cir.
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The rationale for these decisions was perhaps most succinctly
stated by the Ninth Circuit in its en banc decision in Pacemaker
Diagonistic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.:311
The Supreme Court has allowed criminal defendants to waive
even fundamental rights: the right to be free from self-incrimina-
tion .... the right to counsel.... the right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, . . . the right to a speedy trial,...
the right to a jury trial, .. . and even, by pleading guilty, the right
to trial itself .... We refuse to reach the anomalous result of for-
bidding waiver in a civil case of the personal right to an Article
III judge.312
Other cases have agreed with this characterization of the right to an
Article III judge as "personal" or "individual" and, thus, subject to
"waiver" without violating any constitutional limit on the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of federal courts.313 To the extent that there are insti-
tutional (i.e., nonpersonal) interests at stake in preserving Article III
powers in Article III judges, the control exercised by Article IIIjudges over magistrate judges meets those concerns. 314
In applying the Article III consent-to-jurisdiction doctrine to
bankruptcy cases, courts have garbled the theory past recognition.
The analysis began, as with all other constitutional analyses of bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction, with the Supreme Court's decision in Mara-
thon.315 In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist, who along with
Justice O'Connor provided the deciding votes, stated that he would
"hold so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy
Court to entertain and decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's ob-jection to be violative of Art[icle] III of the United States Constitu-
tion. '3 16  Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, echoed this
characterization of the holding, describing it as "limited to the propo-
sition ... that a 'traditional' state common-law action, not made sub-
1987) (finding no statutory authority to refer appeal from final judgment of bankruptcy court to
magistrate judge, even with consent).
311. 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
312. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
313. See, e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1984);
Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984). The Supreme
Court long has recognized the right of parties to consent to a determination of their disputes by
referees or masters. See, e.g., Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S.
(2 Wall.) 123 (1864); cf. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (reference to
master without consent held improper). See generally Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate
Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 343,374-79 (1979); William H. Block, Comment, An Adjudi-
cative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 584 (1973).
314. See, e.g., Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1315-16 (8th Cir.
1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985). But see Reinier H. Kraakman, Note, Article
III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View,
88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979) (questioning the constitutionality of consensual trial authority of
magistrates).
315. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
316. ld. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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ject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an
adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent the consent
of the litigants, be heard by an 'Art[icle] III court'...."I"
This notion of consent as an intentional act by a litigant waiving a
right to an Article III judge and vesting decision-making power in the
bankruptcy court was on a collision course with the historical notion
of the equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges. As described by the
Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landy,31 8 a bankruptcy court had "sum-
mary jurisdiction" acting as a court of equity to deal with a preference
claim against a creditor who had filed a claim in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, because the preference claim then became part of the process
of allowance or disallowance of claims. The Court saw this conclusion
following from the general precept "that bankruptcy courts have sum-
mary jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies relating to property
within their possession." '319 Moreover, the 1898 Act precluded the al-
lowance of a claim of a creditor who had received a preference unless
the preference was disgorged. 320 Therefore, if the trustee raised a
preference claim, the creditor's claim against the estate could not be
allowed or disallowed until the preference matter was resolved, mak-
ing the preference matter "part and parcel of the allowance process
and [ ] subject to summary adjudication by the bankruptcy court.")321
The Court found inapplicable a provision in the 1898 Act that pre-
cluded "suits by the trustee" in bankruptcy court "unless by consent of
the proposed defendant, '322 concluding that the preference action was
not a "suit" and that consent was therefore irrelevant,323 even with
respect to the trustee's claim for disgorgement of the preference.324
Although the plurality and concurring opinions in Marathon
made no mention of Katchen, Justice White's dissent made clear that
if Marathon Pipe Line Co. had filed a claim against the bankrupt
Northern Pipeline Construction Co., the result in Katchen would lead
to the conclusion that "the trustee could have filed and the bank-
317. Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 95 (White, J., dis-
senting) ("Even if the Court is correct that such a state-law claim cannot be heard by a bank-
ruptcy judge, there is no basis for doing more than declaring the section unconstitutional as
applied to the claim against Marathon, leaving the section otherwise intact. In that event, cases
such as these would have to be heard by Art. III judges or by state courts-unless the defendant
consents to suit before the bankruptcy judge-just as they were before the 1978 Act was
adopted.") (emphasis added).
318. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
319. Id. at 329-30.
320. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 57(g), 30 Stat. 544, 560 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
The Code contains a comparable provision at 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1994).
321. 382 U.S. at 330.
322. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 23(b), 30 Stat. 544, 556 (as amended) (repealed 1979).
323. 382 U.S. at 332-33 n.9.
324. Id. at 333-34.
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ruptcy judge could have adjudicated a counterclaim seeking the relief
that is involved in these cases. 32
5
The Court reached the same conclusion in its majority opinion in
Granfinanciera.326 While holding that a creditor which had not filed a
claim against the bankrupt estate had a right to a jury trial when sued
by the trustee for alleged fraudulent conveyances, the Court suggested
that, consistent with Katchen, "a creditor's right to a jury trial on a
bankruptcy trustee's preference claim depends upon whether the
creditor has submitted a claim against the estate .... 327 The Court
distinguished its rationale from the notion of waiver because bank-
ruptcy claimants have no "alternative forum to the bankruptcy court
in which to pursue their claims. ' 328 Rather, the Court viewed the cen-
tral feature of Katchen as the in rem jurisdiction of the court over the
bankruptcy estate in its possession and its power to adjudicate claims
to that property.329
In Langenkamp v. Culp,33 0 the Court took the next step, holding
that creditors who submitted claims against a bankrupt estate were
not entitled to a jury trial on the trustee's preference claims against
them. By filing claims, the creditors triggered the claims-allowance
process which, the Court held, is within the equitable jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.33'
Although the Langenkamp Court never used the words "waiver"
or "consent," and the Granfinanciera Court explicitly rejected the no-
tion that a bankruptcy court's equitable jurisdiction could be premised
on a claimant's "waiver, ' 332 subsequent decisions have found the dis-
tinction between voluntary submission to a bankruptcy court's equita-
ble jurisdiction and involuntary invocation of the equitable claims-
allowance process difficult to discern.3 33 Thus, courts gradually have
expanded the Granfinanciera/Langenkamp rationale in two direc-
tions. First, they have found that the filing of a claim against the
bankrupt estate effectively brings within the bankruptcy court's equi-
table jurisdiction not only preference and fraudulent conveyance
claims3I (of which the Code requires resolution as part of the claims-
allowance process 335 ), but also an assortment of other claims that the
trustee or debtor might bring against the claimant, even if unrelated to
325. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 99-100 (1982)
('White, J., dissenting).
326. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
327. Id. at 58.
328. Id. at 59 n.14.
329. Id. at 57.
330. 498 U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam).
331. Id. at 44-45.
332. See supra note 328.
333. See cases cited infra notes 334-39.
334. See, e.g., Travellers Int'l AG v. Robinson, 982 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1946 (1993); In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 344 (Bankr. D. Me. 1989).
335. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
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the filed claim.336 Second, they have extrapolated from the "volun-
tary" act of filing a claim in bankruptcy to find that other actions by
creditors-such as seeking court approval of a postpetition transac-
tion 337 or filing a counterclaim to the trustee's suit 33 8-and even ac-
tions by the debtor in voluntarily seeking bankruptcy protection339
also resulted in a relinquishment of the right to a jury trial.
Can the concept of waiver or submission to the equitable jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court serve as a constitutional basis for exercise
of the contempt power by a bankruptcy judge? Returning to the pure
concept of consent to jurisdiction by a non-Article III judge, no con-
stitutional impediment exists to parties in a bankruptcy case volunta-
rily agreeing that a bankruptcy judge may hear and determine a
contempt proceeding. Congress has utilized this approach in the Arti-
cle III context not only for magistrate judges, but also to permit bank-
ruptcy judges to conduct jury trials with the consent of all parties. 340
However, the likelihood of an alleged contemnor agreeing to such a
hearing and determination seems remote.
Does the expansive concept of submission to the equitable juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court by affirmative act of the creditor jus-
tify the exercise of jurisdiction over a contempt proceeding? Even if
one were to accept the proposition embraced by the Supreme Court in
Katchen, Granfinanciera, and Langenkamp that certain causes of ac-
tion are so inextricably bound up with the allowance and disallowance
of claims that their assertion should always fall within the equitable
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court (a proposition which is difficult to
reconcile with the Court's holding in Marathon, despite the efforts in
Granfinanciera to do so), such a principle cannot legitimize bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction over contempt. Civil contempt, although not
characterized as a separate proceeding in the same way criminal con-
tempt is identified,341 has no relationship to any claim against the es-
336. See, e.g., Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 508 (1994) (claim of legal malpractice against counsel who filed claim for fees);
In re United States Lines, Inc., 169 B.R. 804, 815 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (complaint seeking
declaration concerning claimant's duties under insurance policies in light of stipulation by debtor
with other parties); In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 67-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dispute
over subordination agreement between creditors implemented in distributions under plan of re-
organization), appeal dismissed, 177 B.R. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 68 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1995).
337. See, e.g., In re Friedberg, 106 B.R. 50, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 131 B.R. 6
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
338. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 170 B.R. 868, 874-75 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Rushton v. Philadelphia
Forest Prods., Inc. (In re Americana Expressways, Inc.), 161 B.R. 707 (D. Utah 1993); Allied
Cos., Inc. v. Holly Farms Foods, Inc. (In re Allied Cos.), 137 B.R. 919 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Bayless v.
Crabtree, 108 B.R. 299, 304-05 (W.D. Okla. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1991); In re
Lloyd Sec., Inc., 156 B.R. 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
339. See N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). But
see Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a trustee
has right to jury trial in action against creditor for tortious interference, among other claims).
340. See supra note 174.
341. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444-45 (1911); Parker v.
United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946).
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tate. Indeed, its only connection to the estate is that a conclusion
adverse to the creditor or third party may augment the estate, a char-
acterization that can be made of any cause of action asserted by a
debtor or trustee on behalf of the bankrupt. If a creditor "volunta-
rily" asserts a claim against a bankrupt estate, that act should not strip
the creditor of its constitutional right to resolution by an Article III
judge of any contempt proceeding against it. Any other conclusion
necessarily would mean that as a practical matter Langenkamp had
limited Marathon to cases involving noncreditors of bankrupt estates
or creditors who are willing to forego not only their claims but also
any defense to claims against them. The Supreme Court cannot have
intended to go so far.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has characterized a contempt proceeding as
"sui generis."342 Whatever its other unique attributes, contempt cer-
tainly holds a central place in defining the exercise of judicial power.
The bankruptcy courts, as reestablished by the BAFJA amend-
ments, exercise (through the adjunct bankruptcy judges) certain judi-
cial powers delegated by the Article III district courts. Such
delegation is circumscribed by statutory and constitutional constraints.
In reaching out to conclude that the powers so delegated include the
power to hear and determine contempt proceedings, courts have mis-
read the language and statutory history of the Bankruptcy Code, ig-
nored the import of Marathon, and insidiously undermined whatever
constitutional foundation may exist for the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts after BAFJA. Expediency cannot be the only guide of
constitutional analysis. Article III was not drafted to construct the
most efficient judicial system imaginable. But a system that requires
an Article III judge to rule on motions for contempt in bankruptcy
cases (in the same manner such judges resolve matters of contempt
before magistrate judges) is certainly not unworkable. A little incon-
venience is a small enough price to pay to protect the constitutional
vesting of the judicial power of the United States in Article III courts.
342. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904); Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC,
330 U.S. 585, 609 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 1996
